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PREFACE
A decade following the 9/11 attacks, the objectives and motivations
of Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda remain largely unknown to the
American public. Since the mission of Al-Qaeda is embedded in its interpretation of the history and traditions of Islam, increased analysis on
the intellectual framework of Al-Qaeda provides valuable insight into
this dangerous ideology that will remain a strategic threat to the United
States for the foreseeable future. While more recent successes against
the Al-Qaeda organization have encouraged talk of “the end of AlQaeda,” the broader ideology remains alive and well. The rise in support
for the Islamist groups in Egypt and North Africa, increasing terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the escalating sectarian war in
Syria all affirm the continued relevance of this topic and its interdisciplinary relationship with national security, global affairs, and international
law. This thesis provides a brief primer of what the Islamist ideology
stands for, its relationship to the Islamic religion, and how understanding
this history can play a central role in assessing long-term American interests.
There are no concrete answers as to how to address the terrorist threat AlQaeda poses, and solutions are as varied as the very problem itself.
Knowledge and understanding of the enemy are important in the War on
Terrorism. It allows the United States and its allies to evaluate their strategies and adjust their tactics to combat Al-Qaeda effectively. The challenge
for military and civilian leaders is to try to objectively understand AlQaeda through its evolution, recognize its dangers, and understand how
their action can influence the current war against it. 1
-U.S. Army Major Sean Wilson

I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2011 death of Osama Bin Laden at the hands of U.S. forces in
Pakistan seemed to bookend a decade-long effort of the United States to
dismantle the Al-Qaeda network. To Americans in the millennial generation, Bin Laden represented the face of Islamist terrorism akin to how
previous generations of Americans perceived the extraterritorial threats
posed by Adolf Hitler, the Nazi leader of Germany, and Joseph Stalin,
the leader of the rivaling Cold War superpower, the Soviet Union. How-

1

Sean P. Wilson, The Evolution of Al-Qaeda (June 15, 2007) (unpublished M.A.
thesis, American Military University), available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/
fulltext/u2/a471461.pdf.

PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION

318

[Vol. 3::10

ever, unlike the defeat of Nazi fascism in World War II or the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1989, the death of Bin Laden did not end the longterm threat of Islamist terrorism to the United States.
Following the formal announcement of Bin Laden’s assassination,
politicians and pundits opined on the impact of Bin Laden’s death for
American national security interests in the fight against Islamist terrorism. Many answers were given in the form of quick one-liners that often
offered little more than a mere expression of celebratory American nationalism. As I watched the news I became both frustrated and perplexed: having spent the majority of my academic research on issues
surrounding Islam, the Middle East, and global terrorism, I was stunned
by the inability or unwillingness of many political leaders to articulate
comprehensive analysis related to the objectives of Al-Qaeda and the
larger issues surrounding the Islamic world.
In 2004, the 9/11 Commission Report powerfully noted that “[t]he
history, culture, and body of beliefs from which Bin Laden has shaped
and spread his message are largely unknown to most Americans.”2 Of
greater concern, however, were the subsequent findings of a 2006 New
York Times article that asked leading policymakers, including a Congressman and a top counter-terrorism official, a relatively simple question: What is the difference between Sunni and Shia Islam? 3 The responses depicted a lack of elementary knowledge of Islam, with one
Congressman, who was unable to answer, poignantly stating, “Now that
you’ve explained it to me. . . what occurs to me is that it makes what
we’re doing over there extremely difficult, not only in Iraq but that
4
whole area.” Since the objectives of Al-Qaeda are embedded in their
interpretation of Islamic history, the continued lack of knowledge of Islam by both policymakers and the larger American public inhibits the
ability of the United States to optimally conduct counter-terrorism policy. As former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer notes:
Bin Laden is fully conscious of the historical resonance of his activities,
and the importance of Islamic history and its heroes in his rhetoric cannot
be overestimated. Although largely illiterate, the Muslim masses know
their faith’s history – particularly military – and its heroes far better than

2

NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION N
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
U.S. 48 (2004).
3
Jeff Stein, Can You Tell a Sunni From a Shiite?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/17/opinion/17stein.html?pagewanted=all.
4
Id. (In 2006 the article had unique importance because at the time Iraq was disintegrating into a civil war between Sunni and Shia Muslims).
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Westerners know theirs. Through sermons, storytelling, and oral histories,
passed from one generation to the next down the centuries, Muslims are intimately familiar with the Islamic past and tend to talk about it in their daily
5
lives.

If a sense of the historical continuity of Islam is not acquired by policymakers, the ability of the United States to properly calculate its longterm national security interests against Al-Qaeda and like-minded Islamist movements is severely compromised.
The primary thesis of this paper is that one cannot completely understand Al-Qaeda and the contemporary dynamics of the Islamic world
without awareness of the previous religious and political events that gave
rise to the modern alignments and ideologies of today. This unique and
holistic approach to explaining the rise of Al-Qaeda through the lens of
Islamic history will illuminate the fact that one is unable to decipher both
the operational elements of the organization and the larger ideology
without viewing its other interrelated parts. Although in isolation some
of these topics may seem like disparate issues, their interconnectivity and
significance are presented as pieces of a cohesive mosaic.
First, it is imperative to make a crucial distinction between the terms
Islamic and Islamist – the latter, a term that is often used in modern political discourse but rarely, if ever, explained. The term Islamic broadly
refers to anything related to the Muslim religion and its traditions. On
the other hand, the term Islamist is a very specific designation primarily
used by Western scholars to identify individuals who support the concept
of Islamism. Islamism concerns a textualist interpretation of Islam and
its efforts to bring the modern Islamic community in line with the examples and teachings of early Muslims during the time of the Prophet. Daniel Pipes explains that:
Islamism is an ideology that demands man’s complete adherence to the sacred law of Islam and rejects as much as possible outside influence, with
some exceptions (such as access to military and medical technology). It is
imbued with a deep antagonism towards non-Muslims and has a particular
hostility towards the West. It amounts to an effort to turn Islam, a religion
6
and civilization, into an ideology.

5

MICHAEL SCHEUER, OSAMA BIN LADEN 167 (2011).
Daniel Pipes, Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism, DANIEL PIPES MIDDLE
EAST FORUM (June 30, 1998), http://www.danielpipes.org/954/di stinguishing-betweenislam-and-islamism; but see John Esposito, Islamic Fundamentalism, BRITANNICA
ONLINE (Nov. 7, 2012, 2:57 PM), http://www.ag-afghanistan.de/funda.htm (arguing
against the usage of the term Islamic fundamentalism: “The term Islamic fundamentalism, while commonly used, is regarded by many as misleading. The term fundamental6
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While Al-Qaeda is considered an Islamist organization – arguably
the most violent and extremist – it is only one of many that share similar
ideological objectives. Although the specific platform of each Islamist
group is slightly different, generally they share the goal of creating a
‘true’ Islamic state with the strict implementation of Islamic law, Sharia.7 Al-Qaeda, cemented in the Western conscious as the world’s most
notorious Islamist organization, is the cornerstone of modern analysis
because of its unrivaled leadership in Islamist terrorism during the past
twenty years.
It is of utmost importance to note that the majority of the world’s
Muslims do not support the militant objectives of extremist Islamist
movements. In 2009 a survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Poll asked
Muslim respondents if they supported Bin Laden in world affairs, with
the percentage of respondents who answered yes as follows: Jordan 28%,

ism is laden with Christian perspectives and Western stereotypes, and it implies a monolithic threat. More useful terms are Islamic revivalism and Islamic activism, which are
less value-laden and have roots within a tradition of political reform and social activism.”
Id. While the author of this article believes Islamic extremism is an appropriate term to
describe elements of the Islamist ideology, Islamic revivalism also provides an adequate
description as well.).
7
KNUT VIKOR, BETWEEN GOD AND THE SULTAN 257 (2005); see RUDOLPH PETERS,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH
TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 144 (2005) (Peters powerfully expands on the objectives
of Islamists:
“The Islamists wanted to establish an Islamic state, and the main characteristic of
an Islamic state was, for them, the enforcement of Sharia in all domains. . . .The
introduction of the Sharia became a rallying cry of the religiously inspired political
movements. The idea of going back to the cultural roots and of imposing Islamic
norms on society was appealing to large segments of the population that were opposed to the increasing Western political and cultural influence. . . .
The crucial element is that Muslims, in order to be good Muslims, must live in an
Islamic state, a state which implements Sharia. It is not sufficient that such a state
gives Muslims the choice to follow or not to follow the Sharia: it must actually
impose Sharia on them, by implementing Islamic criminal law. Preaching and
admonition do not suffice, and a big stick is needed to change behavior in an Islamic direction. Islamic criminal law is a tool to impose a moral order on society,
by enforcing rigorous rules, especially in the fields of sexual morality, blasphemy,
and the consumption of alcohol and drugs.
The establishment of an Islamic state is presented as a religious duty for all Muslims and as an endeavor that may bring Paradise within their reach. And there is
another felicitous prospect connected with it: that of a pious and virtuous community on earth that enjoys God’s favor and is actively aided by Him to overcome
poverty and humiliation. Such a community will be prosperous and strong. The
reintroduction of Islamic criminal law is, from this perspective, a step towards salvation in the Hereafter as well as in this life. It is, therefore, much more than a
merely technical reform of penal law.”).
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Indonesia 25%, Egypt 23%, Pakistan 18%, Israeli Muslims 16%, Lebanon 4%, and Turkey 2%.8 In 2012 the same organization provided updated data on opinions of Al-Qaeda, with the favorable responses as follows: Egypt 21%, Jordan 15%, Turkey 6%, and Lebanon 2%.9 The Pew
study noted that in Pakistan, where Bin Laden was killed and a traditional stronghold for Al-Qaeda, 18% of the population did not participate because it was too dangerous for pollsters to conduct the survey.10
The above data demonstrates that Al-Qaeda is a peripheral organization that does not represent the views of a majority of the Islamic
world. Nonetheless, the same polls also indicate that within the Islamic
world there is a segment of the population that is sympathetic, if not supportive, of Al-Qaeda and its aggressive Islamist agenda. If the decade
since 9/11 has revealed nothing else, it showed that all it takes is a few
individuals to effectuate an attack or encourage others to join their cause.
Thus it is the sizeable and vocal Islamist minority whose ideology must
be understood by policymakers, as they remain, and will continue to remain, a potential threat to U.S. security interests. As this radical Islamist
ideology emanates from the nuances of Islamic history, it is only with a
broader working knowledge of Islam can the seemingly complex objectives of Islamists be properly understood.
The paper is divided into three sections of historical analysis: (1) the
origins of Islam from the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the rise of
the Islamic state in 633 until the collapse of the Abbasid caliphate in
1258, (2) the post-caliphate Islamic world and the growth of the Islamist
ideology from the mid-thirteenth century until 1979, and (3) the impact
of the U.S.S.R. invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent development of Al-Qaeda, the organization that orchestrated the attacks of
9/11 under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden. A second level of analysis chronicles Al-Qaeda following the 9/11 attacks and acknowledges recent developments in the Islamic world, including the “Arab Spring” and
the assassination of Bin Laden. A conclusion provides final thoughts on
the long-term challenges posed by Al-Qaeda and the Islamist ideology.
Accordingly, the historical journey begins in seventh-century Arabia
where the revelations of the Prophet Muhammad and the religion of Islam first originate.
8
Patrick Goodenough, Support for Suicide Bombings and Bin Laden Still High
Among Some Muslims, CNS NEWS, Sept. 11, 2009, http://cnsnews.com/ node/53865.
9
William C. Mann, Poll: Little Muslim Support for Bin Laden’s Group,
OMAHA.COM (Apr. 30, 2012, 5:36 PM), http://www.omaha.com/article/2012043
0/AP09/304309879.
10
Id.
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ISLAM AND HISTORY

The Development of Islam under the Prophet Muhammad

Islamic history begins in seventh century Arabia, which was characterized by tribal violence and stuck in the cross-roads of a regional war
between the competing world powers of the time, the Byzantine and Persian Empires.11 Born in 570 and orphaned at a young age, the Prophet
Muhammad began work as a manager near commercial trading routes in
the bustling city of Mecca, where he quickly developed a reputation
among peers as a man of sound judgment.12 Muhammad routinely traveled from Mecca to Mt. Hira where he engaged in reflective thought and,
at the age of forty, it was at Mt. Hira that he received the first of his reve13
lations from God through the angel Gabriel. Over a period of twentytwo years, from 610 to 632, Muhammad received divine revelations from
God that were later collected and recorded in the Quran (“The Recitation”), the Islamic holy book.14
During the early seventh century, polytheism in Mecca thrived. The
Umayyads, the leading Meccan tribe and overseers of the Kaba (a shrine
that held tribal idols), promoted the continuance of polytheism.15 As the
head of the Islamic nation, Muhammad led as a reformer who sought to
bring the polytheistic Arabian people back to a monotheistic religion and
reaffirm the idea of “one, true God” in the same tradition of Abraham,
the first monotheist.16 Citing the societal ills of Meccan life at the time,
such as corruption and materialism, Muhammad believed the people of
Arabia were in a state of ignorance and unbelief known as jahiliyyah.17
Although Muhammad claimed the same monotheistic tradition of Adam,
Abraham, Moses, and Jesus, Muhammad believed both Jews and Christians did not correctly reveal the word of God. 18 Thus, Muhammad
called for the “total surrender or submission to Allah (islam) and the implementation of His will as revealed in its complete form one final time

11

JOHN ESPOSITO, UNHOLY WAR: TERROR IN THE NAME OF ISLAM 29 (2002) [hereinafter UNHOLY WAR].
12
JOHN ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH 5-6 (2005) [hereinafter THE STRAIGHT
PATH].
13
Id. at 6.
14
Id. at 6-7.
15
Id. at 8.
16
Id. at 8, 12.
17
UNHOLY WAR, supra note 10, at 11.
18
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 12.
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to Muhammad, the last. . . of the prophets.”19
The foundation of Islam is based on the Quran (the message of God
transmitted by Muhammad) and the sunna (the actions and words of the
Prophet recorded by his followers). The Quran, preserved in oral and
written tradition during the lifetime of Muhammad and later codified in
an official version between 644 and 656, is viewed by Muslims as the literal word of God transmitted through the angel Gabriel to Muhammad.20
In addition, Muhammad was viewed as the example that all Muslims
should strive to follow, and thus the actions of the Prophet were a central
component of the early Islamic religious and legal traditions.21 Since
Muhammad was in effect a “living Quran,” stories recounting the actions
and words of the Prophet, known as the sunna, became an early source of
Islamic law that equaled the importance of the Quran itself.22 The individual stories of the Prophet, known as hadith, were collected in both
oral and written form and all the hadith collected together formed the
sunna.23
Muhammad’s message during the first ten years of the Revelation –
steadfastly supported by early converts that included Abu Bakr (a longtime companion of Muhammad who became the leader of the Islamic
community following the death of the Prophet) and Ali (Muhammad’s
cousin and son-in law) – was met with suspicion and prosecution by the
governing Meccan authorities.24 In 622, while under siege by Meccan
tribal rulers, Muhammad accepted an offer to serve as an arbiter between
warring Arab tribes in the city of Medina, thus rising to a leadership po25
sition in the community. Muhammad outlined the duties of all citizens
in the Constitution of Medina and succeeded in unifying Arab tribes under the religious and governmental order of Islam, with the Prophet as its
19

Id.
Id. at 6-7, 20-21.
21
Id. at 11-12.
22
Id. at 11.
23
Id. at 80; see VIKOR, supra note 7, at 32 (“Muslim tradition came to accept [God’s
Revelation] as expressed in two ways: in the Koran, which contains God’s own words;
and through the Prophet’s sunna, Muhammad’s normative sayings and doings expressed
in hadith. Both are revelation, but they are different in nature. The Koran has an established and certain content; there is no disagreement among Muslims over its actual
words, but it needs to be read correctly to be understood. The other source, however, the
sunna, does not have such a clear delimitation. It must go through a dual process; it must
first be determined whether each individual hadith is actually a true expression from the
Prophet before one can draw any normative inferences from its text. But both the Koran
and true hadith are equally valid expressions of God’s revelation.”).
24
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 7-8.
25
Id. at 8-9.
20
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leader.26 In addition, the two hundred individuals that followed Muhammad from Mecca to Medina were considered the first members of
the Islamic community, known as the umma.27 Once the Islamic state in
Medina was established, Muhammad pursued the idea of capturing Mecca, the city at the heart of power and culture in Arabia, in the name of Islam.28
The relationship between religion and political power in the Islamic
tradition merits further discussion. Muhammad “served as both the religious and political head of Medina: prophet of God, ruler, military commander, chief judge, [and] lawyer.”29 Religion and political power were
“indissolubly associated” elements within the Muslim community, which
led the celebrated scholar of Islamic history, Bernard Lewis, to powerfully comment, “the Founder of Islam was his own Constantine, and founded his own state and empire.”30 For readers in the West it can be an arduous task, yet of utmost importance, to conceptualize this distinction
between the Islamic and Christian traditions in their respective approaches to religion and political power. As Lewis notes, the dualistic approach
of the Christian tradition which separates church and state – and guided
by the oft-cited maxim found in Matthew XXII: 21, “render unto Caesar
which are Ceasar’s; and render unto God the things which are God’s” –
is not present in early Islamic history and jurisprudence.31
Before returning to Muhammad’s attempt to capture Mecca, it is
important to address the topic of Islamic holy war, known as jihad. One
of the central tenants of Islam is the idea of jihad, which has two mean32
ings: (1) moral striving, and (2) armed struggle. Although some modern scholars have focused on the individual spiritual element of jihad,
throughout the lifetime of the Prophet and the vast majority of Islamic
history, jihad referred to Islamic holy war, especially when related to is33
sues involving the non-Muslim world.
This meaning of jihad is explained by Georgetown Professor of Islam John Esposito as follows:
Those who wage war (jihad) for God engage in a religiopolitical act, a holy
war. The God who commands this struggle against oppression and unbelief

26

Id. at 9-11.
Id. at 10.
28
Id. at 6-9, 20-21.
29
Id. at 11.
30
BERNARD LEWIS, THE CRISIS
(2004).
31
Id.
32
Id., at 29-30.
33
See id. at 30--31.
27

OF ISLAM:

HOLY WAR

AND

UNHOLY TERROR 6
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will assist His Muslim holy warriors. . . . These holy warriors (mujahidin)
will be rewarded in this life with victory and the spoils of war. Those who
fall in battle will be rewarded with eternal life as martyrs (sahid, witness)
34
for the faith.

Islamic law authorizes jihad for enemies classified as infidels and
apostates, and is a religious obligation of all Muslims.35 While jihad will
resurface again in contemporary discussions, it was Muhammad’s conquest of Mecca in 624 that constituted the first example of Islamic jihad.36
The fight for Mecca commenced at the Battle of Badr in 624, where
an outnumbered Muslim army traveled from Medina and defeated the
37
army of the Meccan tribes. Subsequent battles determined the fate of
Arabia from 625 to 630, but by 630 Muslims succeeded in overtaking
Mecca and converting its people to Islam.38 From 630 until his death in
632, Muhammad consolidated power over Arabia by spreading the Islamic religion and implementing a successful system of taxation
throughout the state.39 In 632, Muhammad participated in the pilgrimage
from Medina to Mecca for the final time and gave his last sermon to the
Islamic community.40 When Muhammad died later that year, he did so
having achieved the once seemingly impossible objective of uniting the
warring tribes of Arabia in the name of Islam.41
B. The Islamic State Following the Death of Muhammad – The
“Rightly Guided Caliphs”
Following the death of Muhammad a disagreement ensued in deciding who should serve as the leader of the Islamic people. A majority of
Muslims believed that the head of the Islamic state, the caliph, should be
chosen from the group of companions to Muhammad as selected by the
42
leadership of the Prophet’s tribe, the Quraysh. A minority of Muslims,
however, believed that only direct kin should follow in the line of suc34

THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 13-14.
LEWIS, supra note 30, at 31-33.
36
Id. at 33-34.
37
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 9.
38
Id. at 10.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 10-11.
41
Id. at 9-11.
42
UNIV. OF PA., A Concise Summary of the Evolution of Islamic Law (Sharia) From
its
Inception
to
the
Present
(Mar.
7,
2012),
http://www.upenn
.edu/emeritus/IslamicLaw.pdf.
35
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cession from the Prophet and that Ali (Muhammad’s cousin and son-inlaw who married his daughter Fatima) should be named the first caliph.43
Ali, however, was passed over in favor of Muhammad’s long time follower Abu Bakr, selected in 632 to serve as the first caliph.44 The issues
surrounding the leadership of Islam continually plagued the early Muslim community and provided the foundation for the future sectarian division between Sunni and Shiite (i.e. Shia) Muslims.45
The historical analysis of the Islamic caliphate is divided into three
distinct eras: (1) the “Rightly Guided Caliphs” (632-661), (2) the Umayyad Empire (661-750), and (3) the Abbasid Empire (750-1258). The
four Rightly Guided Caliphs – Abu Bakr (632-634), Umar ibn al-Khattab
(634-644), Uthman ibn Affan (644-656), and Ali ibn Abi Talib (656-661)
– were not only unique in the sense that they were all companions of
Muhammad, but this era took on later significance in Sunni Islam as an
idealized time period that all generations of Muslims should strive to
emulate. Abu Bakr, the first caliph, took leadership of the political and
military authority of the state and gained significant prestige within the
religious community, best exemplified by his leadership in Friday prayers where Muslims venerated the name of the caliph.46 During Abu
Bakr’s tenure as caliph he successfully repelled tribal rebellions precipitated by the death of Muhammad and further consolidated Islamic authority over the Arabian Peninsula.47
The death of Abu Bakr in 634 led to the rise of his successor, Umar,
an acclaimed military leader who commenced a period of territorial ex48
pansion.
By 641, Umar presided over the rise of Islamic power
through military endeavors into modern day Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and
Egypt. Islamic historian Karen Armstrong notes that the Muslim wars of
expansion were not a “divine mandate to conquer the world” but rather a
desire to further the national interests of the state that were advanced by
a unified Islamic community.49 Upon his death in 644, Umar changed
the methodology in the selection of his successor by appointing an elec50
tion committee to choose the next caliph. This process yielded the rise
of Uthman, whose family was an opponent of Muhammad during his
43

Id.
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 36.
45
Id. at 35-37.
46
Id. at 36.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
KAREN ARMSTRONG, ISLAM: A SHORT HISTORY 27-30 (2002).
50
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 6.
44
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lifetime, to become the third caliph. Uthman’s reign was characterized
by a lack of strong leadership and a rise in tribal factions, which eventually led to Uthman’s assassination in 656.51
Uthman’s death facilitated Ali, supported by some Muslims to become the first caliph instead of Abu Bakr, to now ascend to the position
of the fourth caliph.52 To the partisan supporters of Ali, the first three
caliphs were usurpers of power who did not possess a legitimate claim to
succeed Muhammad as the leader of the Islamic community. However,
Ali came to power in 656 encumbered by two strong opposition movements that were aggrieved by Ali’s failure to bring Caliph Uthman’s
murderers to justice.53 These two separate challenges to Ali’s authority
were respectively led by Aisha, Abu Bakr’s daughter, and Muawiyah, the
Governor of Syria and nephew of Caliph Uthman.54 While Ali was able
to withstand the rebellion of Aisha’s forces, the first time a caliph fought
against another Muslim army, a more serious challenge was posed by
Muawiyah. Muawiyah refused to acknowledge the appointment made by
Caliph Ali to replace him as the Syrian Governor and he withstood an
attack by Ali in 657 to retain power.55 Upon the assassination of Ali in
661, Muawiyah ascended to the position of caliph and proceeded to turn
the Islamic empire into a familial monarchy.56
C.

The Islamic Caliphate During the Umayyad Empire (661-750)

The death of Ali and the rise of Muawiyah to caliph in 661 ended
the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and marked the commencement of
the Umayyad Empire.57 Under Muawiyah the seat of the caliphate was
moved to Damascus and the bureaucratic and judicial spheres of the Is58
lamic empire were strengthened. Society in the Umayyad Empire was
centered on the Arab military aristocracy which had already achieved an
unprecedented expansion of the Islamic state. By the time Muawiyah
became caliph, Islam had spread to Egypt, Libya, the Fertile Crescent,
Syria, Iraq, Persia, and the borders of Afghanistan.59 The expansionary

51

Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 37.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 37-38.
56
Id. at 38.
57
Id. at 40.
58
UNIV. OF PA., supra note 42, at 1.
59
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 40.
52
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military conquests under the Umayyad Empire additionally led to Islamic
control over the Mahgreb (North Africa), Spain, and Portugal.60 The
purpose of these conquests was not to mandate the adherence of Islam to
outsiders, but rather to bring those living in ignorance and unbelief (jahiliyyah) into Islam, as the Prophet himself did in Mecca during the Revelation.61 Since the primary mission of Islam is to end jahiliyyah, jihad
was justified by early Islamic jurists to spread the word of God so the
will of God would be implemented on Earth.62
D. Important Developments During the Era of Expansion Under the
Umayyad Empire
Islamic jurisprudence during the Umayyad Empire guided the trajectory of Islam through the development and implementation of Islamic
law, Sharia. The geographical growth of the Islamic caliphate under the
Umayyad Empire required the advancement of a legal system that allowed the centralized government in Damascus to exercise control over
the far-away lands situated under its authority. The Umayyad Empire
witnessed the changing role of the qadi, or judge, who originally served
as an arbitrator but evolved into a legal authority where the qadi looked
to the Quran to come to legal decisions.63 One of the unique decisions of
the Umayyad’s was to allow the qadi to use local customary law (‘urf) in
making legal judgments, which facilitated great diversity in early Islamic
jurisprudence.64 During this time the evolution of a class of Islamic religious scholars (ulama) built the body of Sharia through individual legal
65
opinions known as fatwas.

60

Id. (discussing the Islamic military expansion in this era, Esposito notes “[The Islamic forces] marched across Europe until they were halted in the heart of France . . . at
the Battle of Tours in 732.”).
61
UNHOLY WAR, supra note 11, at 33.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 34.
64
UNIV. OF PA., supra note 42.
65
UNHOLY WAR, supra note 11, at 34; see VIKTOR, supra note 7, at 10-11 (noting
that the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence developed during this time were
named after their founding scholars: (1) the Maliki school dominated North and West
Africa, from the eastern parts of Sudan up into the southern parts of Egypt, (2) the Hanafi
school evolved out of the Turkish and Mongolian lands and remains the school of Islamic
law practiced from the Balkans to Pakistan and northern India, (3) the Shafi’i school influenced east Africa and Southeast Asia, and (4) the Hanabali school, the last major
school to develop and considered by some to be the most conservative, gained modern
relevance with the Wahhabi movement of the eighteenth century and remains influential
throughout the Arabian peninsula.).
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Two other important elements shaped the early years of Islamic political expansion and legal development: (1) the legal differentiation in
Sharia between Christian and Muslim lands, and (2) reverence in the
Quran for martyrdom. As the Islamic empire spread, Islamic law stipulated that it was a Muslim’s duty to commit jihad against those who rejected Muslim rule.66 John Esposito notes that verses in the Quran – now
commonly referred to as the “sword verses” – were used by Islamic jurists during the era of the early caliphs to support the permissible territorial expansion of the empire through offensive jihad.67 To support the
territorial interests of the Islamic state, leading Muslim jurists argued that
later parts of the Quran abrogated early ones that restricted jihad only for
defensive war.68
Individuals in lands conquered by the Islamic empire had a choice:
they could either convert to Islam or consent to Muslim rule and retain
their religion, albeit subjected to a tax.69 If they refused both options,
however, they would be subject to prosecution.70 Islamic jurists devised
the legal distinction between dar al-Islam (land of Islam) and dar alharb (land of war) and argued the duty of Muslims was to expand the dar
al-Islam to allow the rest of the world to live in the Islamic political and
social order designed by God.71 It must be noted that although subject to
higher taxes and required not to violate Sharia, Jews and Christians were
allowed to practice their religion freely and provided positive contributions to Islamic society under the rule of successive caliphs.72
The second major development involves the reverence in the text of
66

UNHOLY WAR, supra note 11, at 35.
Id. (noting that if the “sword verses” are read in their full context they will convey
a message of peace if there is no interference with Muslims: “When the sacred months
have passed, slay the idolaters wherever you find them, and take them, and confine them,
and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush”); and The Quran 9:5 (“But if they repent and fulfill their devotional obligations and pay the zakat [tax for alms] then let them
go their way for God is forgiving and kind.”).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
UNIV. OF. PA., supra note 42; see ELIE KEDOURIE, POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
19 (1992) (Kedourie expands on the obligations of Jews and Christians under Muslim
rule: “Jizya is the tribute, later understood to be a poll tax, which Christians and Jews had
to pay in humility and in token of submission to the Muslim ruler. In return they received
protection for good [behavior]. In the Muslim polity these non-Muslims were allowed by
the ruler to organize their own communal affairs under their own leaders who enjoyed
wide judicial and administrative powers in respect of their communities, each of which
was allowed to follow its own (religious) law in matters of personal status and inheritance.”).
67
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the Quran for martyrdom. John Esposito cites two verses in the Quran
that clearly express support for martyrdom: “Were you to be killed or to
die in the way of God, forgiveness and mercy from God are far better
than what they amass” (3:157); and, “Never think that those who are
killed in the way of God are dead. They are alive with their Lord, well
provided for.” (3:169).73 Hadith literature further affirmed Islamic reverence for martyrdom by depicting the rewards for those that die a martyr, including being free of sin in the afterlife (and thus not being subject
to an interrogation by angels), and going to one of the highest locations
in heaven close to the Throne of God.74 Since the founding of Islam and
the first jihad of the Meccan Arabs, martyrdom was valorized, and in
many ways the culture of martyrdom was symbolic of the militant ex75
pansionary efforts of the Umayyads.
E. The Official Split Between Sunni and Shia During the Umayyad
Empire
After the death of Muawiyah in 680, his son Yazid was named caliph and inherited a challenge to his power posed by the resurgence of
the followers of Ali, now led by his son Husayn.76 Husayn, who longrefused the validity of the Umayyad caliphate that rose to power following the death of his father, maintained political support among ethnic
Persians who rejected the Arab-dominated Umayyad Empire.77 Caliph
Yazid attempted to quash the Husayn-led rebels by sending his army to
fight, however they were surprisingly met with strong resistance.78
As accounted in Shia tradition, Husayn and his troops withstood six
days of attacks until they were cut from their water supply which forced
79
an imminent confrontation.
Husayn and his outnumbered forces
charged Yazid’s army but were massacred on the field of battle, becom80
ing martyrs for their beliefs. The distinction in Islam between Sunni

73

UNHOLY WAR, supra note 11, at 33.
Id. at 34.
75
Id. at 33-35; see THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 40-41.
76
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 43.
77
VALI NASR, THE SHIA REVIVAL: HOW CONFLICTS WITHIN ISLAM WILL SHAPE THE
FUTURE 40 (2007).
78
Id. at 40-41.
79
Id. at 41.
80
Id.; see id. at 43 (noting from a contemporary standpoint that: “Shias have often
invoked the Husayn story to define their conflicts in modern times: against the Shah’s
forces in Iran in 1979, against Israeli troops in southern Lebanon in the 1980s, and
against Saddam Hussein’s death squads in Iraq during the anti-Ba’thist intifada (uprising)
74
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(the vast majority of Muslims who continued to support the Umayyad
Empire and believed that the torch of Islam should be passed by the tribal elders) and Shia (the minority of Muslims who followed Ali and believed that the leaders of Islam should be based on the Prophet’s familial
relations) was cemented by this battle and led to the development of distinct religious, legal, and cultural practices within the two sects.81 Contemporary Shia expert Vali Nasr analogizes the Sunni-Shia split to that
of the Protestants and Catholics in Western Christianity, noting, “[J]ust
as past intra-Christian politics shaped European politics, so the SunniShia conflict continues to shape the history of the Islamic world and the
broader Middle East.”82
The ability of the Umayyad Empire to withstand the specter of revolt did not last long and by 720, various ethnic and tribal groups significantly challenged the ruling authority.83 One notable faction consisted of
pious Muslims from diverse ethnic backgrounds, who claimed the
Umayyad Empire was departing from the Islamic way of life, condemning the policies of the Umayyads as “un-Islamic innovations.”84 In 747,
a rebel group supported a freed Abbasid slave named Abu Muslim to
lead the opposition against the Umayyads.85 Backed by support from the
Shia community, the rebellion led to the fall of the Umayyad Empire and
in 750, Abu al-Abbas was named the first caliph of the Abbasid Em-

that followed the first Gulf war in March 1991.”).
81
Id. at 42; see id. at 34 (expounding on the contemporary differences between Sunni and Shia: “Most Western discussions of Islamic matters or the Arab world tend to focus, often implicitly, on Sunnism. This is perhaps to be expected, since the overwhelming majority of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims are Sunnis. Shias number from 130
million to 195 million people, or 10 to 15 percent of the total. In the Islamic heartland,
from Lebanon to Pakistan, however, there are roughly as many Shias as there are Sunnis,
and around the economically and geostrategically sensitive rim of the Persian Gulf, Shias
constitute 80 percent of the population.”).
82
Id. at 34; see BARNABY ROGERSON, THE HEIRS OF MUHAMMAD: ISLAM’S FIRST
CENTURY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SUNNI-SHIA SPLIT 347-48 (2007) (“ . . . the Shia community would later venerate these men, the powerless descendants of Ali, as the ‘true
Imams’ who should have ruled in this period. In this world-view Abu Bakr, Oman, and
Uthman do not figure in the list of true Imams, let alone the criminal Umayyads of Damascus, nor the scheming Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad. The list of true Imams begins
with Ali, then passes to his eldest son Hasan (the second Imam), followed by his martyred younger brother Husayn (the third Imam), then on down through Husayn’s son Ali
Zayn al-Abidin (the fourth Imam). All Shiites of whatever creed and persuasion follow
this heritage but thereafter the paths of belief diverge so that there are a half a dozen traditions of loyalty.”).
83
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 50.
84
Id.
85
Id.
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pire.86
F. The Apex and Decline of the Islamic Caliphate under the Abbasid
Empire (750-1258)
Once Abu al-Abbas was named caliph in 750, the capital was
moved from Damascus to Baghdad, which commenced an era of further
cultural, economic, and legal development.87 As caliph, al-Abbas’ first
order was the consolidation of power, which entailed decimating the
same Shia community that provided critical support in helping to overthrow the Umayyad Empire.88 While this further strained relations between the Sunni and Shia, the Abbasid Empire ruled in the name of Sunni Islam and heavily invested in the development of Islamic scholars
(ulama) that provided the next wave of Islamic jurisprudence. One criticism levied by the Abbasids on the Umayyad Empire was that they failed
to develop a fully integrated Islamic legal system, which led to strong
Abbasid support for Islamic legal scholarship.89 As a result, mosques
and academies of learning (madrassas) were established and research on
the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet, the foundation upon which
Islamic law is built, greatly expanded.90 Consequentially, unlike the
Umayyad Empire, the Abbasids ceased using a local-based approach to
Islamic law and moved towards a more streamlined jurisprudence with
an elevated role for the ulama.91
Western history remembers the Abbasid Empire (750-1258) best for
its great economic and cultural advancements, later viewed as the golden
age of the Islamic civilization.92 The linguistic hegemony of the Arabic
language in the extensive Abbasid territories facilitated greater communication over a wide geographical mass and thus became the language of
choice for international academics and businessmen.93 Islamic study of

86

Id. at 50-51.
Id.
88
Id. at 51.
89
Id. at 50-52; see ROGERSON, supra note 82, at 347 (“Abu Muslim would support
the Abbasids . . . not the Alids (the descendants of Ali) . . . . [N]one of the lineal heirs of
the prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatimah and his cousin Ali (the Alids) actually exercised any political authority throughout the long period of Abbasid rule, from
750-1258.”).
90
Richard Martin, Political Growth of the Islamic Empire, in THE SPREAD OF ISLAM
79, 83 (Clarice Swisher ed., 1999).
91
ARMSTRONG, supra note 49, at 59.
92
LEWIS, supra note 30, at 4.
93
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Islamic Civilization, MIDDLE E. INST. (Jan. 24, 2012),
87
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philosophy and science produced great achievements in preserving the
teachings of ancient Greek philosophy while the mathematical fields of
algebra and geometry also witnessed substantial growth.94 Islamic innovation helped move forward the burgeoning fields of chemistry, pharmacology, and veterinary science which in turn facilitated the growth of
medical schools and hospitals.95 Lastly, the period represented a renaissance in Islamic art and architecture, both of which remain vivid in the
unique geometrical designs and wood carvings expressed in the many
great Mosques constructed during the time period.96 In a comparative
perspective, the vibrancy of the Islamic world – espoused by its thriving
cities such as Spanish Cordoba and Baghdad – stood in stark contrast to
the simultaneous developments seen in the war-torn Dark Ages of Euro97
pean Christendom.
The Abbasid Empire was unable to maintain sufficient governmental authority over its vast territory, however, and by the turn of the tenth
century an era marred by rebellion and decline began.98 While the level
of cultural and scholarly achievement remained high throughout the entire Abbasid period, two groups gained control over the caliphate: the
Buyids (945-1055), a Persian Shia dynasty, and the Seljuks (1055-1258),
a Turkish Sunni dynasty.99 Both of these military regimes presided over
a deteriorating political unity, and although an Abbasid was selected to
the position of caliph to preserve the unification of the empire, the real
decision making powers were now vested in a military ruler known as
the sultan.100
The ascent of the Buyids in the ninth century represented a brief decline in Arab influence within the Islamic state, replaced by a resurgence
of Shia power and the re-emergence of Persian language and literature
(this is sometimes labeled the “Iranian Intermezzo” in Middle Eastern
101
history).
However, a competing, more extremist Shia state known as

http://www.mei.edu/content/islamic-civilization.
94
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 53-54.
95
Bassiouni, supra note 93.
96
Id.
97
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 53, 55; see generally MARIA ROSA
MENOCAL, ORNAMENT OF THE WORLD: HOW MUSLIMS, JEWS, AND CHRISTIANS CREATED A
CULTURE OF TOLERANCE IN MEDIEVAL SPAIN, (2002) (depicting Medieval Spain under
Islamic rule and argues that it provides an example of successful inter-faith tolerance.).
98
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 56.
99
MARTIN, supra note 90, at 82.
100
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 56.
101
BERNARD LEWIS, THE MIDDLE EAST: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LAST 2,000 YEARS
81-82 (1995).
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the Fatimid caliphate was also enthroned in 908, and its influence in
Egypt, Syria, and western Arabia challenged the power of the Abbasids.102 The Seljuks seizure of the Abbasid caliphate from the Buyids in
1055 marked the growing Turkish influence in the Islamic world, and by
1079 the lands of Syria and Palestine were reclaimed by the Abbasids
from a weakened Fatimid caliphate.103 Notably, the Seljuks had returned
the caliphate back to Sunni Muslim control and for a short time successfully reasserted authority over the Abbasid Empire.104 It was not to last
though, as the commencement of the Crusades soon posed significant
challenges to the interests of the Seljuk-led Abbasid caliphate.105
The Crusades (1095-1453) began when the Abbasid Seljuk army
defeated the Christian army of the Byzantine Empire, and, in response,
Byzantine Emperor Alexius I called on a unification of Christendom to
fight the “infidel” Islamic state and liberate Jerusalem from Muslim
rule.106 Although the centuries-long Crusades were based on political
and military interests, the religious appeal of the battle drew support
from the Christian masses throughout Western Europe.107 Since 638 the
Islamic empire ruled over Jerusalem, but still provided significant rights
to Jews and Christians while in power.108 The success of the First Crusade brought Jerusalem back into Byzantine control in 1099, but the brutality employed by the Christian forces was remembered by future generations of Muslims as a means of cultivating anti-Christian sentiment:109
the attack by the Christian forces left no Muslim survivors and disrespectfully used the Islamic holy sites of the Dome of the Rock and the al110
Aqsa mosque.
Bernard Lewis notes that although the events of the
First Crusade are cited by modern Islamists as an injustice by the Christians – as stated in the contemporary rhetoric of Osama Bin Laden – the

102

Id. at 83-84.
Id. at 89-90.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 90; see ROGERSON, supra note 82, at 352 (“Ultimately the Fatamid Empire
would be centered on the great new city of Cairo, which at its height governed all of
North Africa, Egypt, and Syria and most of Arabia. The Fatamid Caliphate would be extinguished in 1171 by the great Sunni hero Saladin. . . . Saladin reaffirmed the right of the
Abbasid caliphs, who lingered on in Baghdad, to be considered the legitimate source of
political authority, even though their real power seldom strayed beyond the walls of their
palace-prisons.”).
106
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 58-59.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 59.
110
Id.
103
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historical record suggests that at the time the Islamic empire was indifferent to the loss of Jerusalem to the Crusaders.111
Christian rule over Jerusalem following the First Crusade did not
last long, however, and in 1187 the famed Islamic military leader Saladin
led the effort to recapture the city and return it to Islamic possession.112
In response to the provocations of Reynald of Chatllion, a Crusader military leader who engaged in attacks on both Muslim caravans near the Islamic holy place of the Hijaz and pilgrims headed towards Mecca, Saladin proclaimed jihad against the Crusaders and Jerusalem was reconquered by his army.113 Modern Islamic history, and in particular Islamist movements, make special note of the treatment of Jews and Christians under the new Muslim authority: in juxtaposition to the massacre of
Muslims during the First Crusade, most prisoners of war captured by
Saladin were later granted freedom.114 The individual responsible for
insulting the Islamic Holy Land was not granted such leniency, however,
as Saladin beheaded Reynald himself.115
By the thirteenth century, political and religious factions within the
vast territory of the Abbasid Empire left it weak and vulnerable to attack
from outsiders.116 Following the successful conquests of Genghis
Khan’s Mongol Empire throughout Central Asia, China, and Russia, in
1258 the Abbasid caliphate found itself subjected to the same fate.117
When the grandson of Ghengis Kahn, Hulagu Kahn, eviscerated the capital of Baghdad and executed the caliph and his family, the reign of the
Abbasid caliphate officially ended.118 Out of the vestiges of the Abbasid
Empire, only Egypt and Syria were able to withstand the Mongol forces,
which led to the creation of a separate state known as the Mamluk sultanate.119
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LEWIS, supra note 30, at 47.
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 59.
113
LEWIS, supra note 30, at 49.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 60.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.; see JACOB M. FELLURE & BRIAN THORNTON, THE MIDDLE EAST: THE
NATIONS, THEIR HISTORIES, AND THEIR CONFLICTS 99 (2009) (On the Mamluks: “Islam
guided the Mamluks as they ruled largely Arab lands. As a result, Arabic culture and
language thrived, and Cairo emerged as the heart of the Arab world. In a political maneuver that pleased the Arab masses and satisfied Mamluk religious convictions, a series
of Arab men from the fallen Abbasid dynasty were named “caliph.” Although these men
continued the centuries-old Arab caliphate, these caliphs were actually puppets of the
112
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III. THE FALL, RISE, AND FALL (AGAIN) OF ISLAMIC POWER AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS (1258 – 1979)
Although the end of the Abbasid caliphate might have foreshadowed the imminent decline of Islamic political and religious influence in
the centuries that followed, such dire prognostications never materialized. The emergence of three distinct Islamic empires in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries,120 each rivaling the other for political power, affirmed the lasting influence of Islam throughout the Middle East and
Eastern world.121 However, a growing number of Muslims believed Islamic leaders veered from the true path of Islam, and calls for a return to
classical Islamic teachings became increasingly pronounced.
A.

The Ideology of Ibn Taymiyya, the First Islamic Revivalist

While the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya (1268-1328) originated many centuries ago, his work still resonates in the modern era and endures a special reverence among militant Islamists, including Osama Bin Laden.122
Upon the Mongol defeat of the Abbasid Empire, a once unfathomable
prospect, Taymiyya was forced to leave his home in Damascus and
thereafter held a lifetime animus against the Mongols.123 Taymiyya argued for the return to a textualist interpretation of the Quran and sunna to
purify the Islamic religion and its people, and believed in emulating the
teachings of the original Islamic community during the time of Muhammad.124 John Esposito summarizes Taymiyya’s message:
A return to pristine purity of the period of Muhammad and the First Four
Righteous Caliphs, he believed, was necessary to restore the Islamic community’s power and greatness. He distinguished between Islam and nonIslam (the dar al-Islam and dar al-harb), the lands of belief and unbe125
lief.

Although the Mongol King had recently converted to Islam, Taymiyya justified jihad against the Mongols because of their continued attacks against the Muslim Mamluk rulers in Egypt and their failure to im-

Mamluks, nominally presiding over Sunni Islamic orthodoxy.”).
120
ARMSTRONG, supra note 49, at 115.
121
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 60.
122
UNHOLY WAR, supra note 11, at 44-45.
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Id. at 45.
124
Id. at 45-46.
125
Id. at 46.
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plement the true interpretation of Sharia.126
As a professor of Sunni law in the conservative Hanabali school of
Islamic jurisprudence, Taymiyya was unique in that he served as both an
Islamic legal scholar and political activist.127 Contemporary analyst
Sean Wilson explains:
Critical to understanding Al-Qaeda’s jihad is Taymiyya’s notion of takfir.
Taymiyya believed that Muslims who failed to follow the path of the salaf
(the values and practices of the prophet and his companions) were apostates
and enemies of Islam. Takfir was a means of excommunicating unfaithful
Muslims. According to Taymiyya, there could not be peace between the
kafir (infidels) and Muslims. It was every Muslim’s duty through jihad to
128
force the kafirs to see the true path of Islam.

Although Taymiyya’s ideas failed to gain momentum during his
lifetime – in fact, his teachings led to his eventual imprisonment – his
views played a considerable role in the growth of Islamist ideologies that
spawned during the eighteenth and twentieth centuries.129
B. The Three Post-Abbasid Islamic Empires: The Ottomans, Safavids,
and Mongols
Global Islamic political power arguably reached an apex in the sixteenth century during the reign of three separate Muslim empires that
competed with each other for regional geo-political influence.130 The

126
Christopher Henzel, The Origins of Al-Qaeda’s Ideology: Implications for U.S.
Strategy, PARAMETERS, Spring 2005, at 71.
127
UNHOLY WAR, supra note 11, at 45; see VIKOR, supra note 7, at 101-02 (noting
that the Hanbali school was formed about a century after the other three Sunni schools of
jurisprudence with a stricter interpretation of hadith. On some issues, but not all, the
Hanbali view is considered more conservative than the other schools and a more literal
interpretation of the Quran and the sunna.).
128
Wilson, supra note 1, at 3.
129
UNHOLY WAR, supra note 11, at 45.
130
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 60; see ARTHUR G. SHARP, THE
EVERYTHING GUIDE TO THE MIDDLE EAST: UNDERSTAND THE PEOPLE, THE POLITICS, AND
THE CULTURE OF THIS CONFLICTED REGION 111 (2011) (The rise of the Ottomans led to the
collapse of the Mamluk sultanate: “From the late 1300s to the early 1500s Egypt was basically in a state of emergency as major economic problems, food shortages, and the
Black Plague magnified existing dissatisfaction with the Mamluk sultans. Because of
fatalistic religious ideas, little was done to contain the plague, resulting in the decimation
of Cairo’s population – with as many as 7,000 deaths per day during its worst period.
With Cairo in disarray, Ottoman armies moved as far south as Mamluk-controlled Syria.
Hoping to repel the Ottomans, cavalrymen raced from Egypt to Syria, but Ottoman canons overpowered the prideful Mamluks, who rejected gunpowder as a “weak man’s
weapon.” Continuing south into Egypt, Ottoman firepower dealt the final deathblow, as
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Turkish Ottoman Empire (1492-1918), the Safavid Dynasty of Persia
(1500-1779), and the Mongols of India (1526-1730)131 provided the catalyst for another era of political and cultural advancement within Islam.132
While all three empires maintained distinct cultural and religious identities, each respectively developed stronger bonds between the state and
Islamic institutions than during the Abbasid period: the Ottoman Empire
codified Sunni Sharia, the Safavid Persians incorporated Shiism as the
official religion of the state, and the Mongols were heavily influenced by
a small sect of Islam known as Sufism.133
The Ottoman Empire developed out of the vacuum of power left by
the successors of Genghis Kahn and maintained a proud Mongol-Turkish
tradition that fused militancy and a strong connection to classical Islam.134 The Ottomans were the primary flag bearers of the Islamic caliphal tradition and the most prominent representatives of Islam to the
outside world in the West.135 Under the leadership of the sultan – given
names such as “Warrior of the Faith” and “Defender of the Sharia” – the
Ottomans extended their dominance over the Arab Middle East and
North Africa.136 Subsequent Ottoman military victories also led to the
incorporation of Greece, Cyprus, the Balkans, and the majority of Eastern Europe.137
Although efforts to further the Ottoman’s expansionist jihad were
kept in check by the victories of both Mediterranean Christians in 1580

the Mamluks were overrun outside Cairo in 1517.”).
131
Martin, supra note 90, at 84-85.
132
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 60-61.
133
ARMSTRONG, supra note 49, at 115-116; see THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12,
at 100-03 ( noting that Sufism is a minority branch of Islam that is not discussed in this
paper because it is largely peripheral to the contemporary issues surrounding the Islamist
ideology and Al-Qaeda. For more information on Sufism, Esposito provides succinct
analysis.).
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THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 61.
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Id.
136
Id.
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Id.; see Bernard Lewis, The Ottoman Empire and Its Aftermath, 15 J. CONTEMP.
HIST. 27 (1980) (“Islam was the traditional basis of the Ottoman state as of virtually all
other states in the classical Islamic world. . . . The polity was conceived as the Community of Muslims, its head as the successor of the Sultans and Caliphs of the glorious past
and as the holder of an Islamic sovereignty dedicated to the maintenance of Islam and the
extension of its domain.”); Rogerson, supra note 82, at 355 (“Later generations of Ottoman sultans would be acknowledged as the greatest rulers of the Muslim world, though
their claim to the Caliphate emerged only in 1774 from the chance wording of a treaty
with Russia. As an exclusively Turkish dynasty without a drop of Arab blood, let alone
that of Prophet Muhammad, the Ottomans’ claim to the Caliphate was not always accepted outside their own wide domains”).
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and Eastern Europeans in Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Empire nonetheless buttressed a return of Islamic artistic and scholarly achievements last
seen during the Abbasid period.138 The Ottomans found great prosperity
under the sultanate of Suleiman al-Qanuni (1520-1566), known as “the
Lawgiver,” who declared Sharia the official law throughout the empire
and employed judges (qadi), Islamic legal advisors (muftis), and teachers
in schools (madrassas) as agents of the state.139 By the sixteenth century, however, the Ottoman grip on regional hegemony was challenged by
the emergence of the two other rival Muslim empires: the Safavid Dynasty (in modern Iran) and the Mongol Empire (in the Indian subcontinent).140
The ethnically Persian and religiously Shiite Safavid Dynasty
(1500-1779) came to power following the collapse of the Persian Empire, the historical link between Shia Islam and the modern state of
Iran.141 The first Safavid ruler, Isamail, claimed religious legitimacy
when he linked his bloodline to the twelfth (hidden) imam and declared
himself shah, the religious and political leader of the Shia state.142
While the Sunni Ottomans and Shia Safavids fought many wars for regional hegemony, Safavid culture and scholarship thrived. Like the Ottomans, the Safavids produced works of magnificent architecture and
oversaw the expansion of Shia jurisprudence.143
The third Islamic power of the era, the Indian Mongol Dynasty
(1526-1730), was a Sunni Muslim state which, through its power base in
the city of Delhi, successfully ruled over a majority Hindu population.144
Not to be outdone by their neighboring Islamic rivals, the Mongols
thrived in architecture and the arts, engineering the construction of the
grand Taj Mahal and fusing the Ottoman and Persian traditions of artistic
design in celebrated paintings. However, as the modern European nation-state system developed in the aftermath of the sectarian religious
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wars of the Christian Dark Ages, an era of unprecedented European economic and political modernization commenced. Importantly, the advancements in Western Europe soon left the three Islamic empires in
significant comparative decline.145
C. The Ascent of Islamic Revivalist Movements: The Rise of
Wahhabism in Arabia
On the precipice of the rapid decline in the power of the Islamic
empires, some traditionalist Arabian Muslims gained momentum in their
objective to effectuate a return to classical practices and teachings of Islam. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an Islamic legal theologian who
ascribed to the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya and identified with the conservative Hanabali school, became the primary revivalist of the early eighteenth century.146 Al-Wahhab, like Taymiyya before him, believed that
the Islamic nation was living in a state of ignorance (jahiliyyah) similar
to the Meccan community during the time of Muhammad.147
The developing political weakness of the Islamic states, to alWahhab, directly correlated to the deviation from classical Islamic practices. However, al-Wahhab preached that if Muslims began to live in accordance with life as it was during the time of the Prophet, as expressed
in the Quran and sunna, prosperity would return to the Islamic people.148
As John Esposito explains:
For Ibn abd al-Wahhab . . . . [a]ll subsequent, post-Prophetic developments
and the time-honored interpretations of the ulama and the law schools were
subject to review and reevaluation in the light of Islam’s fundamental
sources. The purpose of ijtihad was a return to a purified Islam by weeding
out those un-Islamic beliefs and practices that had infiltrated the law and
life of Muslims. . . . For Abd al-Wahhab, the Islamic way of life was to be
149
found in pure, unadulterated form in the seventh-century community.

In 1765 al-Wahhab joined forces with Muhammad ibn Saud, a
widely influential local tribal chief, and together they united factions in
Arabia to implement their purist vision of Islam, thereafter known as the
Wahhabi movement.150 The lasting influence of al-Wahhab proved sig-
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THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 64-67.
Id. at 118-119.
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Id. at 118-19; see LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL-QAEDA AND
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nificant in shaping the growth of offspring ideologies in Africa and India,
and to this day Wahabbi principles remain central to Saudi Arabia’s
modern application of Sharia.151
D. The Decline and Collapse of the Islamic Empires and the Rise of
European Colonialism
The eighteenth century witnessed the deterioration of the three great
Muslim empires, and unlike declines of the previous Islamic regimes, a
resurgence of Islamic power never materialized.152 The downward spiral
of the Islamic empires – all built largely on agriculturally dominated
economic programs – coincided with the Europeans unprecedented technological innovations in science, education, and industry that facilitated
widespread commercial enterprise and an overall increase in the European quality of life.153 As Bernard Lewis details:
In the Middle Ages Europe had little to offer to the far more advanced and
sophisticated societies of Islam. . . . [Islam] was immunized against anything coming from Christendom – that is to say, from a society which, according to the Muslim perception, represented an earlier and outdated stage
of the religious civilization of which Islam represented the final perfection.
. . . Such major movements as the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enincluded: “God clothed Himself in a human form; he rejected the intercessory prayer of
saints and expressions of reverence for the dead; and he demanded that Muslim men refuse to trim their beards. He banned holidays, even the Prophet’s birthday, and his followers destroyed many of the holy sites, which he considered idols. He attacked the arts
as being frivolous and dangerous. He gave a warrant to his followers that they could kill
or rape or plunder those who refused to follow his injunctions.”).
151
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra. note 11, at 119; see ASLAN, supra note 142, at 246
(noting the influence of Wahabbism in the subsequent development of Islamist organizations: “Thanks to Saudi evangelism, Wahhabi doctrine has dramatically affected the
religio-political ideologies of the Muslim Brothers, Mawdudi’s Islamic Association, the
Palestinian Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, to name only a few groups. The Saudis have become the patrons of a new kind of Pan-Islamism: one based on the austere, uncompromising, and extremist ideology of Islamic fundamentalism, which has become a powerful
voice in deciding the future of the Islamic state.”).
152
ARMSTRONG, supra note 49, at 137-38; see Ira Lapidus, Islamic Revival and Modernity: The Contemporary Movements and the Historical Paradigms, 40 J. ECON. &
SOC. HIST. ORIENT 444, 449-50 (1997) (“In the course of the 18th century Islamic regimes
everywhere collapsed or were in decline. The Safavid dynasty which had ruled Iran since
1500 was destroyed by Afghan and other tribal forces. The Ottoman Empire was in
course of disaggregation as . . . notables established their locally based authority and
small scale independent governments. Mongol suzerainty, challenged in the 18 th century
by Sikh, Maratha, and other provincial separatist movements, and by the rise of British
power in Bengal, gave way to British paramountcy and was liquidated altogether after the
Mutiny of 1857.”).
153
ARMSTRONG, supra note 49, at 142-43.

PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION

342

[Vol. 3::10

lightenment, and the Scientific Revolution passed unnoticed and without
effect. . . . There was no response to the European Renaissance, and no
Reformation. All these ideas and others that followed them were seen as
154
Christian and discounted accordingly.

European capitalism furthered the economic expansion and dominance of trade by the great powers of Christendom. It was not until the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that the Islamic empires even realized the magnitude of the threat posed by the increasingly powerful European states.155 Accordingly, during the mid-nineteenth century the
mercantilist objectives of the new world powers were fulfilled: the European and Eastern nations colonized a significant portion of the Islamic
world and forced economic modernization to further their own financial
156
interests.
E. The Response of the Trilogy of Islamic Reformers: Al-Afghani,
‘Abduh, and Rida
The encroachment of Western European powers into Muslim lands
– the first experience of Islam as politically and economically subservient to Christian states – facilitated a resurgence in Islamic revivalism
154

LEWIS, supra note 101, at 316-17.
Lapidus, supra note 152, at 449-50.
156
ARMSTRONG, supra note 49, at 146; see Ted Thornton, Colonialism in Africa and
the Middle East, HIST. MIDDLE E. DATABASE, http://www.nmhtthornton.
com/mehistorydatabase/colonialism_in_africa_and_the_mi.php (last visited Nov. 14,
2012) (chronicling the development of the European colonial presence in Islamic territories: The British became involved in Egypt and the Sudan in the early 19 th century; the
French and British built and controlled the Egyptian Suez Canal, constructed in 1869, to
further their commercial interests; Britain went to war with Iran in 1856 to solidify access
to trading routes; in 1860, the French reasserted their presence in Lebanon and Spain invaded Morocco; the Berlin Conference of 1885 divided colonial rights to Africa between
the European powers; in 1907 Britain and Russia agreed to split colonial influence in
Iran; and, lastly, Italy commenced its colonial influence over Libya in 1911); see also
ASLAN supra note 142, at 222-223 (commenting on the impact of European colonialism
on the Islamic world: “To keep Europe’s industries running, the colonized lands were
rushed towards modernization. European ideals of secularism, pluralism, individual liberties, human rights, and, to a far lesser degree, democracy – the wonderful legacy of the
Enlightenment that had taken hundreds of years to evolve in Europe – were pressed upon
the colonized lands with no attempt to render them in terms the indigenous population
would either recognize or understand. Western technology was shared only insofar as it
increased production. New cities were built instead of old cities being developed.
Cheaply manufactured imports destroyed most local industries, and native markets had
little choice but to focus almost exclusively on the economic needs of the colonial powers. In return for the pillaging of their lands, the suppression of their independence, and
the destruction of their local economies, the colonized peoples were to be given the gift
of civilization.”).
155
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throughout the nineteenth century.157 One of the leading revivalists was
Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (1838-1897) of Cairo who maintained influence
throughout the ideologically disparate Islamic territories and even parts
of Western Europe.158 Paradoxically, Al-Afghani respected Western
reasoning but diverged from most other Ottoman reformers who supported the liberalization and the adoption of Western education, science, and
religious secularization as a means of catching up with centuries of European advancements.159 John Esposito notes that in rejecting the doctrine of Western liberalism and secularization, Al-Afghani’s ideas for reform were based on two main principles: “(1) Islam is a comprehensive
way of life, encompassing worship, law, government, society; (2) the
true Muslim struggles to carry out God’s will in history, and thus seeks
160
success in this life as well as the next.”
Thus, to Al-Afghani reform
did not mean Western liberalization, but rather a glorified return to the
practices and teachings of the early Muslim tradition. An implementation of classical Islamic practices, Al-Afghani argued, would facilitate
the re-emergence of the glorious cultural and intellectual achievements
experienced by the Islamic civilization in previous centuries.161
Al-Afgani served as a harsh critic of the state-backed Islamic jurists,
the ulama, and supported the purification of Islam through ijtihad (reinterpretation) of Sharia, a method of legal interpretation cited by Taymiyya and implemented in the preceding century by the followers of AlWahhab in Arabia. Moreover, Al-Afghani played a formative role in the
development of pan-Islamism, a movement that fused Muslim nationalism with anti-colonial sentiment and found popular support within the
larger Islamic community. In particular, Al-Afghani’s anti-colonial doctrine led him to support constricting the power of Islamic rulers through
constitutionalism and parliamentary government, which endeared him to
a generation of Muslim youth. The teachings of the widely influential
Al-Afghani heavily influenced Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida, his
prized students who became the trailblazers of the next generation of Is162
lamic reformers.
Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905) was long considered the favorite
pupil of Al-Afghani and heir to his ideological tradition: the two collabo-
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rated together in publications and ‘Abduh joined his mentor when he was
forced into exile in Paris following an unsuccessful nationalist uprising.163 When ‘Abduh returned to Egypt, however, he became a lauded
Islamic jurist within the ulama and obtained the most prominent status of
Grand Mufti, the head judge presiding over the entire Sharia court system in Egypt. In diverging from some of the positions of his teacher AlAfghani, ‘Abduh argued that Islam and science were not inherently at
odds with each other, believing that the decline of Islam was precipitated
by both un-Islamic practices and a misplaced rigidity with which the
ulama interpreted Sharia.164 Like his ideological predecessors ‘Abduh
supported the practice of private reinterpretation (ijtihad)165, but unlike
previous revivalists he provided an important distinction between fundamental unchanging truths in Islam and other lesser values that could
shift in accordance with the passage of time.166 In that same vein, ‘Abduh became a pioneering reformer who effectuated liberal reforms at the
prominent Egyptian al-Azhar University, where he increased female educational opportunities and also criticized the negative impact of polygamy in the Muslim world.167
Over the course of the early twentieth century the teachings of ‘Abduh were used to defend two competing objectives: liberal reformers
supported the secularization of Islam justified by ‘Abduh’s progressive
tendencies, while Islamists emphasized ‘Abduh’s teachings to follow the
path of the aslaf, the uncorrupted and pure early followers of Islam.168
Although ‘Abduh became known as “the Father of Islamic Modernism in
the Arab World,” following his death, his protégé Rashid Rida carried
the mantle of the Afghani-Abduh tradition, but then returned it toward
169
the more conservative and militant sphere of revivalist teachings.
Rashid Rida (1865-1935) believed the triumphs of early Muslims
were God’s reward for his faithful followers and blamed current deviations from the true practice of Islam on three factors: (1) imperial intrusions of the Europeans, (2) Western philosophy, and (3) the influence of
170
Shiite Muslims.
Furthermore, like his predecessors, Rida contended
that state-sponsored Islamic scholars were unable to bring the Islamic
163
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community in line with the traditions and values of early Islam. 171 Rida
affirmed the position of Al-Afghani, who first posited the pan-Islamic
argument that the unification of the Islamic community would only be
facilitated by the restoration of the Islamic caliphate and implementation
of classical Sharia.172
Like Afghani and ‘Abduh, Rida was motivated by celebrated revivalist influences – the doctrine of the conservative Sunni Hanabali
school, Ibn Taymiyya, and the Wahabbi movement – and became increasingly Islamist throughout his lifetime. The impact of World War I
on the Muslim world led Rida to increasingly speak out against modernism, which he believed would lead to the Western secularization of Islam. Rida’s views against modernity added a strong anti-Western element to the Islamist ideology, and were reinforced by the Muslim
Brotherhood and other like-minded organizations with a greater intensity
in the years that followed.173
F.

World Wars I and II and the Shaping of the Modern Islamic World

The start of World War I in 1914 represented the culmination of
centuries of decline in Islamic power relative to the growing influence of
the West. Moreover, it was the aftermath of World War I that upended
the political and religious order that had existed during the previous four
centuries in the Islamic world.174 In 1914, the Ottomans aligned with
imperial Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, joining a military
alliance known as the Central Powers. Upon the defeat of the Central
Powers, the victorious Allied powers of England, France, and Russia
oversaw the international post-war environment that gave rise to three
important developments in the Islamic world: (1) the disintegration of the
Ottoman Empire and the subsequent creation of a secular Turkish state,
(2) the creation of the modern state of Iran in the land of Persia, and (3)
175
the official recognition of statehood for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
First, out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse in 1919
came the rise of Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, who implemented an unprecedented program of economic modernization and religious secularization, which officially separated Islam from the governance of the state.176
171
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Second, the Eastern lands of the now-defunct Persian Empire became
ruled by the dictatorship of Reza Khan, who seized power and proclaimed himself shah of Iran in 1925.177 Although Reza Shah consolidated power and implemented an economic modernization program, unlike Ataturk he did not denounce or disentangle the roots of Shia Islam
within the state or in Iranian civil society. Third, in 1924 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz
ibn Saud, the leading descendant of the Saudi tradition that embraced the
Wahhabi ideology, gained control over the Arabian holy lands of Mecca
and Medina (previously held by the Turks) and cemented his power with
the formal recognition of statehood for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in
1932.178
Notably, the increased immigration of Eastern European Jewry to
Palestine due to the rise of religious persecution throughout Europe following World War I furthered the momentum of the Jewish Zionist
movement. The 1917 Balfour Declaration, which proclaimed British
support for the creation of a “National Home for the Jews,” was of significance in the Islamic world because Britain maintained administrative
control over Palestine’s majority Muslim population and the prospect of
a Jewish state in Palestine potentially challenged Islamic interests.179
Concurrently, there was a backlash in parts of the Islamic world in response to the economic and religious modernization programs implemented by mostly pro-Western Muslim leaders and a small percentage of
the population that formed the aristocratic elite.180
The ideological fusion of ardent nationalism with fascist rule by the
Italian and German governments in the inter-war years (1918-1939) attracted substantial Arab support, particularly for Nazi Germany. Notably, the Nazis cultivated the favor of Muslims through anti-Semitic propaganda promoted throughout the Middle East. As World War II (19391945) progressed, the Islamic territories were again turned into a battleground for the conflict between the great world powers, this time in the
form of the bifurcated alignment between the Allied (U.S., Britain, and
the recently established Soviet Union) and Axis (German, Italy, and Japan) forces. The success of the Allies in the War was followed by Western occupation of Islamic lands, and some elements of the colonial order
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remained, such as the British in India and the French in North Africa.181
G.

The New Islamists: Hasan al-Banna and Mawlanda Ala Mawdudi

The creation of two early twentieth century Islamist organizations,
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (led by Hasan al-Banna), and Jamaati-Islami in India (led by Mawlanda Ala Mawdudi), highlighted the rising
influence of mainstream Islamist movements that merged anti-imperial
sentiment with revivalist calls for a return to classical Sharia.182 Both
groups developed in part as a reaction against British colonial influence
and contained a message that rejected all Western elements of life, including science and technology as well as social elements such as music
and dress.183 Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-i-Islami
promulgated the view that modern Muslim society was plagued by ignorance (jahiliyya), which could only be remedied through the practice of
reinterpretation (ijtihad).184
The messages of both groups resonated beyond the working class
and found support among civil servants and educated professionals, as
membership in the Muslim Brotherhood peaked somewhere between five
hundred thousand to one million members. Although supportive of panIslamic values that called for the creation of a unified Muslim nationstate, the impact of al-Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood and Mawdudi’s Jamaat-i-Islami was primarily felt in local political efforts in Egypt and
pre-partitioned Indian Pakistan, respectively. The lasting ideological and
organizational influence of both groups was affirmed during the latter
half of the twentieth century when both movements spread throughout
the larger Islamic world: the Muslim Brotherhood continued to grow
throughout Sudan, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Kuwait, while Jamaat-iIslami expanded to India, Afghanistan, Kashmir and Pakistan.185
181
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Id. at 151-53; see Kedourie, supra note 72, at 328-29 (noting the influence on
Rashid Rida on Hasan al-Banna and impact of the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood:
“Rashid Rida’s call to a purified Islam which would go back to its pristine state was not a
specifically political [program], nor did Rashid Rida attempt to establish or to lead a political movement. Another much less learned and much more activist figure, the Egyptian Hasan al-Banna (1906-49), who was very much influenced by Rashid Rida’s writings, did attempt to do so. . . . In 1928 Banna established the Muslim Brotherhood as an
association devoted to the amelioration of the condition of the poor and the deprived, by
teaching them ways of self-help, by restoring their self-respect, and tending to their spiritual welfare. Banna’s activity was built on the premise that salvation lay in a return to
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H. The Long-Term Impact of the Post-War Era in the Islamic
Heartland
The end of the World War era (1914-1945) resulted in seismic
change in the geo-political landscape of the Middle East, which emanated from the protracted withdrawal of Western imperialist powers from
the region. The end of the former colonial authorities led to the creation
of independent nation-states throughout the Islamic world over the
course of four decades. As Bernard Lewis summarizes:
In the aftermath of the First World War, three states in the region, Turkey,
Iran, and Afghanistan, possessed full sovereign independence and had
lengthy experience in exercising it. The inter-war period added four Arab
states, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq and Egypt . . . .The enforced departure of
France from the Levant added Syria and Lebanon to the roster of Arab sovereign states. The League of Arab States was formed in March 1945 . . . .
186
A year later . . . Jordan also gained independence.

Along with the many Arab nations granted statehood during this period, 1948 marked the end of the British mandate over Palestine, which
led to the creation of the Jewish state of Israel. In addition, from an economic perspective, technological innovations during the World War era
witnessed the increased reliance of the major economies on petroleum, a
commodity of abundant supply in the lands of the Middle East. While
the Western powers used their political influence to facilitate advantageous deals for oil, the 1950’s and early 1960’s also saw the further disengagement of Western imperialism that led to the independence of an
array of Arab states: Libya, the Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania,
187
Kuwait, Algeria, and South Yemen.
the Koran and in the practice of solidarity and mutual help according to the maxim that
all believers are brethren. The Muslim Brotherhood obviously answered a crying need,
for during the 1930s it grew by leaps and bounds; it established an extensive network of
branches and of co-operative enterprises and its teaching found [favor] not only among
the poor and the illiterate, but also, increasingly, among the educated and within the professions. It was what may be called a grass-roots movement, in that it was neither the
outcome of official action, patronage, or inspiration, nor was it indebted in any way to the
Westernized political leaders who played the political game in Cairo.”).
186
LEWIS, supra note 101, at 357.
187
Id. at 352, 358; see James Risen, Secrets of History: The C.I.A. In Iran, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/Mideast/04 1600iran-ciachapter1.html. (The Iranian Parliament, under the leadership of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, voted in 1951 to nationalize the oil industry which coincided with the
concurrent resurgence of the Communist party. In response, in 1953 British and American operatives worked together to remove Mossadegh from office and restore the authoritative power of the Shah, who subsequently reinforced Western friendly oil agreements.
Risen provides an accurate summation of the historical record of the American involve-
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I. Egyptian Politics and the Suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood
under Nasser
In July 1952 Gamal Abd-al Nasser rose to power by overthrowing
the Egyptian monarchy with the aid of the Muslim Brotherhood, which
appeared to signal an end to a century of Western-styled development in
Egypt.188 However, in seeking to consolidate power and expand his influence to the larger Arab world, instead of implementing Sharia (as was
expected), Nasser devised a distinct program of nationalist Arab socialism. Nasserism, as it came to be known, was marked by state control of
Islamic courts and Al-Azhar University, the influential Islamic center of
learning, which were both used to legitimize Nasser’s programs in the
name of Islam. However, Nasser faced significant resistance from two
sources: Saudi Arabia, which did not appreciate Nasser’s condemnation
of conservative Muslim regimes, and the Muslim Brotherhood, which
felt betrayed by Nasser’s failure to implement a traditional Islamic state
and ordered its marginalization and prosecution. In 1965, Nasser arrested members of the Muslim Brotherhood suspected of plotting his assassination.189 One of the leaders detained by Nasser was the outspoken
Egyptian Islamist Sayeed Qutb.190
J.

Sayeed Qutb and the Rise of the Contemporary Islamist Ideology:

Sayeed Qutb grew up in Egypt where he was well versed in the
classics of the European literary canon and influenced by Western dress
191
and entertainment.
However, as an adult, Qutb became an ardent anti192
colonial nationalist and a conservative Muslim.
In 1948, while serving as a bureaucrat in the Egyptian government’s Ministry of Education,
Qutb was sent to study at American universities.193 Qutb shared the
widespread Arab sentiment against Western support for the creation of
Israel and maintained strong views on women and sexuality, which he
ment in Iran during this time period.); but see STEPHEN KINZER, ALL THE SHAH’S MEN:
AN AMERICAN COUP AND THE ROOTS OF MIDDLE EAST TERROR (2003) (Depicting the continued detrimental influence of Mossadegh’s overthrow in contemporary U.S.–Iranian
relations. While Kinzer sometimes indulges in Monday morning quarterbacking and
places disproportionate blame on U.S. foreign policy, his account of history nonetheless
serves as provocative commentary.).
188
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189
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saw as a corrupting force in American society.194 In 1949, when Qutb
moved to the American West to further his graduate education, he was
aghast at attending a college party and seeing, “dancing naked legs . . .
arms draped around the waists, chests met chests, lips met lips, and the
atmosphere was full of love.”195 Other similar impressions held a lasting
impact over Qutb, and by the end of the year he was convinced of the
moral degeneracy of the West. When Qutb left America he concluded
that America was a “spiritual wasteland.”196
Upon returning to Egypt in 1950, Qutb published his views of
America and what he believed was its non-existent moral value system,
proclaiming, “ . . . the white man in Europe or America is our numberone enemy.” Author Lawrence Wright comments on Qutb:
His concern was modernity. Modern values – secularism, rationality, democracy, subjectivity, individualism, mixing of the sexes, tolerance, materialism – had infected Islam through the agency of western colonialism.
America now stood for all that . . . . He intended to show that Islam and
modernity were completely incompatible . . . . Separation of the sacred and
the secular, state and religion, science and theology, mind and spirit, these
were the hallmarks of modernity, which had captured the West. But Islam
could not abide such divisions . . . . Islam was total and uncompromising. It
197
was God’s final word.

While Qutb originally supported Nasser during his early years in
power, it soon became clear that Nasser’s program of Arab socialism did
not comport with the objectives of Qutb, who held no desire for compromise in the demand for the implementation of Sharia. Qutb was imprisoned for his political activities for the first time in 1954, and although
he was briefly released after three months in jail, he was again arrested
later that year for his involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood’s con198
spiracy to assassinate Nasser.
After his trial in 1966, a mere show trial
for the increasingly totalitarian Nasser regime, Qutb stated, “I performed
jihad for fifteen years until I earned this martyrdom. . . . My words will
be stronger if they kill me.” Accordingly, Qutb was hung in August
1966.199
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IV. THE MODERN ISLAMIC WORLD AND THE CREATION OF AL-QAEDA
A. Geo-Political Developments in the Muslim World during the 1960’s
and 1970’s
Contemporary scholarship in the West has paid significant attention
to the long-term influence of Qutb in the expansion of the Islamist ideology throughout the mid-twentieth century.200 The 9/11 Commission Report accurately summarized the developments during the successive decades of the 1960’s and 1970’s in the Muslim world following the
execution of Qutb:
The secular regimes promised a glowing future, often tied to sweeping ideologies (such as those promoted by Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser’s Arab Socialism or the Ba’ath Party of Syria and Iraq) that called for a
single, secular Arab state. However, what emerged were almost invariably
autocratic regimes that were usually unwilling to tolerate any opposition –
even in countries, such as Egypt, that had parliamentary tradition. Over
time, their policies – repression, rewards, emigration, and the displacement
of popular anger into scapegoats (generally foreign) – were shaped by the
201
desire to cling to power.

Relations between the Islamic world and Israel reached a low when
the Israelis defeated the united Arab armies in the 1967 “Six Day War,”
which was a crushing military embarrassment for the Muslim community. Although often divided along nationalist and sectarian lines, efforts
against Israel remained the one issue that the Muslim world continually
rallied together to support. Following the Six Day War, many Muslims
were attracted to the idea of a more conservative approach to religion as
they blamed the shameful military defeat of 1967 on the deviation from
202
classical Islam.
At the same time, the increasingly autocratic Islamic
regimes successfully silenced or eliminated the more conservative Islam203
ist dissidents in their predominately secular nation-states.
This dichotomy provided the foundation for the revolutionary fervor of 1979.

200
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B. The Iranian Revolution, Sunni Extremism in Saudi Arabia, and the
Afghan War
Significant events in 1979 changed the fundamental structure of the
Islamic world, and this new era was best characterized by the emergence
of previously silenced Islamists. The major developments of 1979 were
highlighted by: (1) the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini,204 (2) the revolt against the Saudi monarchy by dissidents,205 and (3) the U.S.S.R. invasion of Afghanistan and the commencement of the Afghan War.206
The Islamic Revolution in Iran was the most visible of all three developments as it was ushered in by Iranian protesters against the Shah
who held American citizens hostage at the U.S. embassy in Tehran. The
global media chronicled the daily developments of protests by Iranians
against the policies of the well-known Shah, long admired in the West
for his progressive ideology that was favorable to their interests. The
Iranian Revolution emanated in large part from the Shah’s failure to successfully implement economic modernization and his increasingly dictatorial tendencies, which led to dissent among both the conservative Shia
Islamic community and traditionalists in the professional class. Many
Iranians believed Shia Islam provided a viable alternative to the Shah’s
efforts at Westernization and protesters used Shia religious symbols that
linked the early struggles of Ali to the contemporary efforts against the
Shah.207
A long-standing critic of the Shah, Shia legal scholar Ruhollah
Khomeini, returned from political exile in France to lead the opposition
208
movement.
Khomeini fused strong anti-Western and anti-Israeli
views with his conservative Shiite religious training, and upon the overthrow of the Shah, Khomeini was named the leader of Iran (the Ayatollah). As Ayatollah, Khomeini devised a unique system of Islamic governance that elevated the Shia clerical establishment to the primary
source of political and legal authority.209 Notably, immediately after the
204

See THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 179-86.
See id. at 193-94.
206
NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 2, at 55-56.
207
THE STRAIGHT PATH, supra note 12, at 179-180.
208
Id. at 183.
209
Id. at 183-184; see WRIGHT, supra note 150, at 55 (Khomeini was the first major
Islamic leader to directly challenge the Western notion of freedom. Khomeini stated:
“Yes, we are reactionaries, and you are enlightened intellectuals: You intellectuals do not
want us to go back 1,400 years. . . . You, who want freedom, you intellectuals: freedom
that will corrupt our youth, freedom that will pave the way for the oppressor, freedom
205

2013]

ISLAMIC HISTORY & AL-QAEDA

353

regime change in Iran, in 1980 the Iran-Iraq War commenced. The War
pitted the majority Shia, and ethnically Persian, state of Iran against Iraqi
strongman Saddam Hussein, a Sunni Arab leader that ruled over a majority Shia, but ethnically Arab population.210 The United States and other
Sunni Arab states supported the Iraqis, yet the bloody and destructive
war between the Iranians and Iraqis lasted for the next eight years.211
The second significant development occurred in Saudi Arabia,
which witnessed the first manifestation of a rebellion by Islamists within
its own borders. In November 1979, the Grand Mosque in Mecca was
held captive for two weeks by hundreds of protesters who criticized the
Saudi monarchy and called for the establishment of an even more con212
servative Islamic state.
While the Saudi leadership defused the situation by receiving a fatwa from the state-supported Islamic jurists (ulama)
for Saudi forces to intervene, only a week later a Shia uprising ensued in
the eastern part of Saudi Arabia, inspired by the recent ascent of Shia
Aytollah Khomeini in Iran.213 The Saudi Arabian Shia claimed discrimination by the Sunni majority (specifically, calling for a fairer distribution of oil wealth), and the Saudi Shiites were boosted by support from
Ayatollah Khomeini, who used the uprising as an opportunity to criticize
the rival Saudi regime and the other Sunni Arab states.214 The events in
Saudi Arabia signified two emerging challenges for the Kingdom: (1) the
threat posed by Sunni Islamists, and (2) the rise of Shia Iran as its major
economic, political, and religious competitor in the Islamic world.215
The third major development of 1979 began when the U.S.S.R. invaded Afghanistan, and the Islamic forces that organized in opposition to
the Soviet invasion later provided the foundation for the creation of AlQaeda. Following the end of World War II the Soviets asserted geopolitical influence over most of Central and Eastern Europe, lands that
were also home to many Muslims who now lived within the orbit of the
Communist superpower.216 A Communist uprising in 1978 in Afghani-
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stan was supported by the arrival of Soviet troops in 1979 to solidify Afghanistan within the sphere of Soviet power. However, in response the
conservative leaders of the Muslim world called for jihad to resist the
presence of the godless Soviets in Islamic lands.217 Buoyed by decades
of Islamist momentum and a move within the larger Islamic world toward more traditional Islam, the opportunity to fight jihad against the
Soviets resonated with many Muslim men from the Middle East who
traveled to Afghanistan and soon became known as the “Afghan Arabs.”218 One of the individuals that joined the jihad was a wealthy young
man from Saudi Arabia named Osama Bin Laden.219
C.

The Islamization of Osama Bin Laden

Osama Bin Laden was the son of one of the most successful Saudi
businessmen – one of fifty-four children from the elder Bin Laden’s
twenty-two wives – whose childhood was filled with soccer games and
television.220 At the age of fourteen, Bin Laden had a spiritual awakening that led him to believe Muslims had deviated from the true path of
Islam, which moved him to personally become more pious and disavow
Western dress and television shows.221 In particular, Bin Laden maintained piety in relation to sexuality, once admonishing a friend of his
brother who owned a pornographic magazine.222 Bin Laden biographer
Lawrence Wright noted that, “throughout his life, [Bin Laden] would
hunger for austerity like a vice: the desert, the cave, and his yet unspoken
desire to die anonymously in a trench in warfare.”223 In the early 1970’s
Bin Laden joined a Saudi affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood, at the
time an underground and non-mainstream Islamist movement in Arabia,
224
and began to pray for the reestablishment of a unified Islamic state.
In 1976 Bin Laden enrolled at the King Abdul Aziz University in
Saudi Arabia to study economics, yet his attention remained focused on
225
interpreting the Quran, jihad, and establishing an Islamic charity.
While at university, Bin Laden read Sayeed Qutb’s novels and attended
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the weekly speeches of Sayeed Qutb’s brother, Mohammad Qutb, who
served as a lecturer for the school.226 At the time Mohammad Qutb was
defending his brother’s intellectual legacy from the ideas of Hasan
Hudaybi, another Islamic scholar who argued the militant positions of
Qutb had gone too far and Muslims should not judge the piety of other
Muslims.227 The opposing visions of Hudaybi and Qutb launched a debate within Egypt about what it meant to be a Muslim, and, while Bin
Laden was originally persuaded by the ideas of Hudaybi, with the passage of time his views evolved to be much more in accordance with the
militant Islamist ideology espoused by Qutb.228
D.

Bin Laden Joins the Jihad

In 1980, at the age of twenty-three, Bin Laden traveled to Afghanistan to join the fight against the Soviets but differed from other jihadists
because of his wealth and family background.229 The unique connections of Bin Laden led him to become a leading financier for jihad operations in Afghanistan, which were also being supported covertly by the
United States which sought to halt the spread of communism. 230 Along
with prominent Egyptian Islamist Dr. Abdullah Azzam, Bin Laden utilized his contacts in Pakistan to develop an organization that channeled
both fighters and funding in efforts against the Soviets.231 In part because of the efforts of Bin Laden, by 1988 between ten and twenty thousand fighters had completed training for jihad in Afghanistan.232
In 1987, as the Afghan War became heavily tilted in the Islamic resistance fighters’ favor, the organizational infrastructure in Afghanistan
and Pakistan developed by Azzam and Bin Laden evolved into the foun233
dation for a new Islamist group called Al-Qaeda (“the base”).
Upon
the death of Azzam in 1989, Bin Laden stood as the uncontested leader
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of Al-Qaeda.234 At the time of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and
subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, the stated objective of AlQaeda was to overthrow Islamic dictators in the Middle East and return
the Muslim community to the true form of classical Islam.235 Bin Laden
biographer Michael Scheuer emphasizes the transformative impact of the
defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, the first military victory for Muslims in centuries, which evoked a sense of accomplishment and pride
throughout the entire Islamic world.236 According to Scheuer, through
the eyes of Bin Laden, “Moscow’s withdrawal from Afghanistan . . .
gave instant plausibility to the idea that non-Muslim interference in the
Muslim world justified a defensive jihad, and that such a jihad could
succeed.”237
E. How the First Gulf War Leads Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to View
America as the Enemy
After a peace treaty was reached to end the Iran-Iraq War in Saddam Hussein’s slight favor, it motivated the emboldened Iraqi dictator to
undertake the annexation of an oil rich neighbor, the small Sunni Arab
state of Kuwait.238 In response Bin Laden offered Saudi Arabia, aligned
in defense of the sovereignty of Kuwait, the support of Al-Qaeda to defend against the acts of Iraqi aggression.239 However, Bin Laden was
spited by the Saudi leadership in favor of American forces, which utilized Saudi military bases within the territory of the Kingdom to successfully launch counter-attacks on Iraq in the Gulf War.240 The rejection by
Saudi Arabia, coupled with the utilization of American forces instead of
Al-Qaeda in Islamic lands, incensed Bin Laden and left him convinced
that the United States was the cause of the problems facing the Islamic
241
community.
Following the Afghan War, in 1991 Bin Laden moved to the Sudan
where he consolidated his authority over Al-Qaeda and set up a platform
for commercial operations that funded the terrorist activities of the or-
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ganization.242 By this time Bin Laden had become a well-known Islamist in the ideologically influential areas of Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula,
and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, and in 1992 Al-Qaeda issued its first fatwa against the United States for its occupation of Muslim
lands during the Gulf War.243 Later, in a 1996 fatwa Bin Laden called
for an uprising against the monarchy in Saudi Arabia, as well as attacks
against the United States, which he criticized as the enabler of wayward
Muslim governments.244 In the fatwa against Saudi Arabia and the United States, Bin Laden attempted to appeal to the larger Islamist cause with
the hope that the mission of Al-Qaeda would transcend ethnic and geographic boundaries of the modern Islamic world.245 Analyst Sean Wilson notes the 1996 fatwa outlined Al-Qaeda’s three distinct objectives:
“[1] the overthrow of the Saudi government for its betrayal of Islam; [2]
the expulsion of the United States from Muslim lands; and [3] the establishment of a true Islamic state (the caliphate).”246
F.

The Growth of Al-Qaeda under Bin Laden in Afghanistan

When small attacks by Al-Qaeda between 1992 and 1996 failed to
generate a significant response from the international community, Bin
Laden sought to expand his jihad beyond the confines of the Islamic
world. In a 1998 fatwa, Bin Laden first announced his intention to attack
U.S. and European interests in their own homeland.247 Upon pressure
from the United States and Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden was expelled from
the Sudan in May 1996 but quickly found refuge in Afghanistan. Central
to Bin Laden’s decision to go to Afghanistan was its geographical proximity to Pakistan, a traditionally secular Islamic state which experienced
248
a resurgence of traditionalist Islamic teachings since the 1970’s.
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Southeast Asian Islamic revivalism – best exhibited by the Deobandi movement, an Islamist ideology in existence since the nineteenth century that incorporated elements of Wahhabism – provided a fertile ideological climate for Al-Qaeda and its objectives.249 Bin Laden’s arrival
coincided with the 1996 capture of Kabul by the Taliban (translated as
“students”), a group of ethnic Pashtun Sunni Muslims led by many individuals who studied at Islamic schools (madrassas) and trained in camps
created by Bin Laden.250 Importantly, in 1995 the revivalist Taliban was
recognized by the Pakistani government as the ruling power of Afghanistan, and between 1995 and 2001, relations flourished between the Taliban and the Pakistani intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) agency.251
Once in Afghanistan, Bin Laden possessed a missionary zeal in his
pursuit of attacking American interests and orchestrated the August 1998
bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. While the U.S. responded with aerial strikes that unsuccessfully attempted to kill Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda struck again in October 2000 with an attack on the U.S.S.
Cole. Notably, the attack on the Cole led Bin Laden to comment, “I
knelt to thank God for this heroic operation that damaged the prestige of
the United States and served as a warning for them to leave the Arab
world . . . .”252 After the attack on the Cole, Bin Laden further solidified
his ties with Taliban leader Mullah Omar to prepare his organization for
the aftermath of a large scale attack that he believed would initiate a di-
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rect confrontation with the United States.253 Upon receiving confirmation of the strike against America on 9/11, Bin Laden proclaimed,
“[t]here is America, hit by God in one of its softest spots . . . God has divided the world in two-sides – the side of the believers and the side of
the infidels . . . . Every Muslim has to rush to make his religion victorious. The winds of faith have come.”254
V.
A.

ON AL-QAEDA: 9/11 TO THE PRESENT

The Response Begins: The War in Afghanistan

It is important to trace developments following 9/11 until the present that will likely shape the operative environment of Al-Qaeda and the
Islamist ideology in the early twenty-first century. The attacks of 9/11
led to an immediate shift in President George W. Bush’s political agenda
from an initial focus on domestic initiatives to a two-term presidency
consumed by foreign policy, most specifically the War on Terrorism.255
Central to his administration’s counter-terrorism policy was the enactment of the “Bush Doctrine,” which held terrorist attacks would be treated as acts of war (and not crimes) and the U.S. would make no distinction between terrorists and the states that harbor them.256 Within weeks
of 9/11 the U.S. launched an attack on Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban and capture or kill Bin Laden. While the capital city of Kabul was
in American possession by mid-November, the Al-Qaeda leader evaded
capture in Afghanistan and fled into the familiar – but to U.S. forces, territorially unfriendly – mountainous border region with Pakistan.257 After
overthrowing the Taliban, American forces presided over democratic
elections in Afghanistan which led to the election of President Hamid
Karzi in 2004 and a new parliament in 2005.258
253
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B. The War on Terror Expands: The Second Gulf War and the
Removal of Saddam Hussein
Following the end of Taliban control in Afghanistan, the Bush administration shifted its attention toward Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator whom neoconservatives now in a position to influence U.S. foreign
policy long desired to remove from power.259 The primary justification
provided by the Americans in their case against Hussein was his alleged
possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), a claim supported
by flawed intelligence provided by Iraqi exiles in the 2002 U.S. National
Intelligence Estimate. In October 2002, Congress authorized President
Bush to form a coalition in preparation for invasion, and with primary
allied support limited to that of Great Britain, in March 2003 the U.S.
commenced Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although American forces easily
secured control of Iraq and captured Hussein in December 2003, the situation in Iraq quickly deteriorated as Iraqi militias representing sectarian
Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish interests led the country to the brink of civil
war.260
C.

Outsourcing Islamism: The Rise of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)

While the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan ended the sanctuary status for Al-Qaeda training camps, the organization still remained operational to coordinate attacks in Indonesia, Kenya, Tunisia, Morocco,
Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Spain, and Britain.261 While diligent counter-
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terrorism reforms by national governments constricted the ability of AlQaeda to continue its spree of international terror, the sectarian violence
in Iraq presented a new front for the organization to operate.262 Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Islamist religious leaders – in particular
those from Saudi Arabia – issued fatwas that called on Muslims to fight a
defensive jihad, a message that resonated in particular with the Sunni
community in Iraq.263 Led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an individual first
introduced to Wahhabi Islam in a Palestinian refugee camp, Al-Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI) served as an outsourced affiliate of the core organization built
by Bin Laden. Using the internet as a means of recruiting and aided by
the Abu Graib prison abuse scandal, AQI utilized both the quartermillion newly unemployed Iraqi men and foreign fighters who arrived
for jihad against both the American forces and the Shia majority in
Iraq.264 At its apex of influence in 2006-2007, the AQI organization
maintained the capacity to cause up to 185 casualties per day, an almost
unfathomable figure indicative of the level of violence experienced during the worst days of the U.S. occupation.265
Policy analyst M.J. Kirdar notes that in the early stages of the
American occupation AQI provided the core Al-Qaeda organization with
three major objectives: (1) furthering their notion of a war on Islam by
the powers of the West, (2) unifying disparate Islamist groups against a
common enemy, the United States, and (3) serving as a sanctuary for AlQaeda operatives and foreign jihadists.266 However, the tactical overreach of AQI – exemplified by its Taliban-like attempt to implement
Sharia and the refusal to cease its use of indiscriminate violence – led
267
100,000 individuals to disavow support for the organization.
As a result, the mass defection of AQI operatives damaged the local brand of
Al-Qaeda and defectors provided valuable intelligence to aid in counter268
terrorism efforts.
The death of Zarqawi in 2006, coupled with the
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success of President Bush’s “troop surge” under General David Petraus,
led to a precipitous decline in violence and veered Iraq away from a civil
war.269
D.

Al-Qaeda: 2007 – 2010

While the U.S. succeeded in quelling the sectarian violence in Iraq
and containing the destructive capabilities of AQI, the larger Al-Qaeda
organization remained a relevant threat to the United States and the international community. In 2007, Al-Qaeda affiliates assassinated the internationally admired Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto for her
attempts to crack down on the organization’s presence within Pakistan’s
borders.270 Not surprisingly, the long suspected ties between Al-Qaeda
and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were again affirmed as
the ISI cleaned the crime scene prior to the procurement of evidence.271
In November 2008, Pakistani jihadists in Mumbai, India, massacred civilians as the attackers held hostages at the famed Taj Mahal hotel in the
single most deadly terrorist attack since 9/11. David Headley, a Pakistani-American with ties to the Pakistani ISI and Al-Qaeda, helped facilitate the attack by providing tactical information to Lashkar-e-Taiba, the
Islamist group responsible for the plot and its implementation.272
As Islamist attacks were being launched on non-American interests,
terrorist plots with links to Al-Qaeda continued to target the American
homeland. In December 2009 a Nigerian jihadist with ties to Al-Qaeda
unsuccessfully attempted to blow up an airliner during a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit with a bomb in his underwear that went undetected.
Subsequently, U.S. counter-terrorism officials halted Al-Qaeda plots to
273
attack the New York City subway system and Chicago cargo jets.
Again, in April 2010 a Pakistani, with ties to the Taliban, attempted to
explode a car bomb in the middle of New York City’s Times Square on a
bustling Saturday evening. Only the diligence of a local street vendor,
who noticed smoke coming from a suspicious vehicle, enabled the New
York Police Department to stop the imminent and potentially devastating
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attack from materializing.274
E.

The 2010-2011 “Arab Spring”

In December 2010 a twenty-six year-old Tunisian fruit and vegetable merchant, Mohamed Bouazizi, was harassed by the police to pay a
bribe to allow him to continue selling his goods. Upon refusal, the police
beat Bouazizi and proceeded to steal his produce and weighing scale.
Following unsuccessful attempts to contact the Governor to voice his
grievances, an infuriated Bouazizi soaked himself in petrol and lit himself on fire, causing burns on ninety percent of his body. 275 Bouazizi’s
actions set off a chain of events that led to an unexpected revolution
throughout the Islamic world, now collectively known as the “Arab
276
Spring.”
Bouazizi’s story immediately unleashed a wave of protests and riots
throughout the streets of Tunisia, a country plagued by chronic unemployment and inflation as well as rampant political corruption and cronyism. With historical precedent on his side, Tunisian President Ben Ali
did not view the protesters as a real threat and had little reason to believe
that the twenty-three year reign of his military autocracy was in jeopardy.277 Upon the death of Bouazizi, however, the riots intensified and
only nine days later Ali abdicated his position as president for political
asylum in Saudi Arabia. BBC security correspondent Frank Gardner
succinctly encapsulated the surprising developments: “The rule of President Ben Ali was over, triggered on the face of it, by the suicidal actions
of a frustrated grocer.”278
After the events in Tunisia, the momentum shifted to Egypt as a
wave of reform rapidly spread throughout the Islamic world. National
Public Radio (NPR) summarized the developments in December 2011:
Egypt: Government overthrown on February 11, 2011. President Hosni
Mubarak steps down, faces charges of killing unarmed protesters. Elections held on November 28, 2011. Protests continue in Tahrir Square.
Libya: Anti-government protests begin on February 15, 2011, leading to
civil war between opposition forces and Moammar Gadhafi loyalists. Trip-
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oli was captured and the government overthrown on August 23, 2011.
Gadhafi was killed by transition forces on October 20, 2011.
Syria: Protests for political reforms have been ongoing since January 26,
2011 with continuing clashes between the Syrian army and protesters. On
one day in July, 136 people were killed when Syrian army tanks stormed
several cities.
Yemen: Ongoing protests since February 3, 2011. President Ali Abdullah
Saleh is injured in an attack on June 4, 2011. On November 23, 2011, he
signs a power-transfer agreement ending his 33-year reign.
Other nations: Protests and uprisings related to the Arab Spring also took
place in other countries as well, including: Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
279
Morocco, and Oman.

In analyzing the events of the Arab Spring, Islamic commentator
Mansoor Moaddel distinguished the events of 2011 from the wave of reform that swept the Islamic world during the 1950’s and 1960’s, when
Arab nationalism rose to prominence (i.e. Nasserism).280 Moaddel optimistically noted that unlike the Arab nationalist movements which occurred over a half-century ago, the Arab Spring was largely nonideological.281 To support his position, Moaddel cited the 84% of Egyptians and 66% of Lebanese who responded to pollsters that the current
movements were intended to produce freedom and democracy or economic prosperity.282 Lastly, Moaddel emphasized the transformative nature of the internet and text messaging which provided new avenues for
young activists to circumvent government authorities in organizing politically.283
Although the events of the Arab Spring were welcomed with open
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arms by many in the international community, the realist approach to international politics suggested a cautionary pause, as these events gave
rise to an uncertain future and a vacuum of power in the Islamic world.
Almost foreshadowing the predicament American policymakers find
themselves in today, the current President of the Council on Foreign Relations Richard Haass noted in 2004 that, “a lesson we should have
learned from what took place in Iran twenty-five years ago, namely, that
unattractive authoritarian regimes can be replaced by something far
worse.”284 Raghida Dergham, a journalist for the pan-Arab newspaper
Al-Hayat, commented on the unsuspecting role of Islamists in Egypt following the overthrow of the Mubarak regime: while the youth led the
protests with hopes of bringing Egypt into modernity, the more experienced and organized Islamist parties subsequently took advantage of the
opportunity created by the protesters.285 Imploring the women of Egypt
to rise up, Dergham pessimistically concluded that if women failed to assert their voice in the political process, men will maintain the authority to
interpret the laws of Sharia and the “Arab Awakening will end in the
Slumber of Dark Ages.”286
F.

The Assassination of Osama Bin Laden

With the dust barely settled from the Arab Spring – and arguably,
still settling – during the evening of April 30, 2011, President Obama
summoned the American media for an unexpected presidential announcement. From the East Room of the White House, President Obama
explained to the American people that on his orders U.S. forces killed
Bin Laden in a targeted operation at a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. President Obama asserted:
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For over two decades, Bin Laden has been Al-Qaeda’s leader and symbol. .
. . The death of Bin Laden marks the most significant achievement to date
in our nation’s effort to defeat Al-Qaeda. But his death does not mark the
end of our effort. There’s no doubt that Al-Qaeda will continue to pursue
attacks against us. We must and we will remain vigilant at home and
287
abroad.

Following the announcement, the major American news outlets captured Americans – in particular, college-aged Americans – pouring into
the streets outside the White House and Times Square to celebrate the
death of the founder of Al-Qaeda.288 Isobel Coleman, a contributor to
the Council on Foreign Relations, noted that the reaction in Pakistan to
the news of Bin Laden’s death was significantly more nuanced: Coleman
cited a reader’s comment posted on the website of a leading Pakistani
newspaper that stated, “My Muslim friends are happy that Bin Laden is
dead, but they are afraid to say that publicly.”289
VI. CONCLUSION
A.

Al-Qaeda Today: A Three-Tiered Movement

With both the historical background of Islam and development of
Al-Qaeda until the present day established, one primary question remains: What is the state of Al-Qaeda today? Rick Nelson, Director of
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, constructively labels
the current structure of Al-Qaeda as a movement – not an organization –
with three distinct branches: (1) Al-Qaeda core, (2) Al-Qaeda associated
movements, and (3) Al-Qaeda inspired movements. Al-Qaeda core re-
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fers to the command center of the organization formed by Bin Laden,
traditionally based out of Pakistan and Afghanistan.290 Information obtained from the compound of Bin Laden following his assassination suggested he remained more involved in the daily activities of the organization than previously believed, but his inability to control operatives such
as Zarqawi of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) also depicts the limitations of the
core leadership to control its affiliates.291 Although the U.S. has predominately eliminated the original pre-9/11 infrastructure of Al-Qaeda, the
groups and individuals acting in the name of Al-Qaeda remain a significant threat to American interests.292
The second group, Al-Qaeda associated movements, refers to the
loosely affiliated organizations working under the larger mantle of AlQaeda, such as Zarqawi’s AQI, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), and the Somali based groups, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) and al-Shabbab.293 By establishing streams of revenue through
the narcotics trade and kidnapping activities, Al-Qaeda associated organizations have ensured their medium-term financial sustainability.294
Moreover, these smaller affiliate organizations pose unique challenges to
American security interests because of their propensity to engage in frequent, but inexpensive attacks (such as the attempted Christmas Day
bombing, which was facilitated by AQAP).295
The third group, Al-Qaeda inspired movements (“lone wolves”), is
defined as individual cells unaffiliated with the official Al-Qaeda organization.296 While lone wolf operations are a newer development, they
have already been evidenced in the U.S. homeland, most notably by the
attempt of the Times Square bomber and a 2009 shooting at the Fort
Hood military base by Nidal Hasan, a U.S. army officer who attacked in
protest of American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nelson concludes that at this juncture, Al-Qaeda affiliate groups and lone wolf operatives remain the greatest threat because of their focus on small scale at290
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tacks and the limited financial resources available to American security
officials to protect against such operations.297
B.

Closing Argument

The focus of this analysis depicts how the objectives of Al-Qaeda
operate within a much broader story of Islamic history that remains
largely unknown to the American public. As the historical record clearly
delineates, Islamist ideas are embedded throughout the Islamic tradition
and are not the machinations of a single crazed lunatic in an empty cave,
as some in the West have satirically portrayed Bin Laden.298 The astute
Washington Post reporter David Ignatius used the one-year anniversary
of the assassination of Bin Laden as an opportunity to acknowledge the
historical nature of Islamist movements as it pertained to the Arab
Spring:
What’s happened in the last year is a rejection of the super-violent tactics
that Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda have used to try to purge this Western influence from the Islamic world. But the idea is still there, and the people who
were the kind of ideological forbearers, Hassan al-Banna, the founder of
the Muslim Brotherhood, [and] Sayyed Qutb, a key Muslim Brotherhood
figure, those are the people that many of these new Islamist politicians who
are in office, members of the Egyptian Parliament . . . . [T]hey look to these
people and their indignation against the West and the desire to have a sepa299
rate kind of life.
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In the years and decades to come, the level of support for Al-Qaeda
and its ideology is likely to be determined by the environment within the
larger Islamic world. The destabilizing events of the Arab Spring provide the Islamic world with yet another opportunity for reform, but as the
history contained in this thesis has shown, reform in Islam has recently
veered more towards Islamist revivalism than liberalization. Will history
repeat itself once again?
In a recent interview with the Wall Street Journal, Bernard Lewis –
a leading British-American expert on Islamic history cited throughout
this work – was asked about his views on the Arab Spring. In response,
Lewis straightforwardly opined, “I think that the tyrannies are doomed,
300
the real question is what will come instead.”
While Lewis noted the
influence of the young activists whose political mobilization led to significant changes in the Islamic world in the past two years, he cautioned
that he had seen similar optimism before and remained reluctant to proclaim victory for the liberal reformers.301 Lewis concluded the interview
by stating, “I think the struggle will continue until [the Islamists] either
obtain their objective or renounce it. At the moment, both seem equally
improbable.”302
Following the June 2012 U.S. drone assassination of Abu al-Libi,
the number two leader of Al-Qaeda based out of Pakistan, the respected
CNN terrorism analyst Peter Bergen commented that, “the terrorist group
that launched the 9/11 attacks is now more of less out of business.” Bergen noted Al-Qaeda has failed to successfully attack the United States in
over a decade, and while he agreed lone wolf attacks remain a threat, he
argued only seventeen Americans were killed in such attacks since
9/11.303 In contrast, Bergen highlighted the average of fifty-four Americans killed each year by lightning, leading him to surmise that, “to the
average American, lightning is about 30 times more deadly than jihadist
terrorism.”304 Although Bergen’s work is often laudable, by comparing
the likelihood of jihadist terrorism to a bolt of lightning, Bergen is at risk
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of trivializing the continued national security interest in understanding
Islam, Islamic history, and the extremism espoused by Islamist ideas.
Beyond Al-Qaeda and other like-minded organizations, Islamism is
alive and well, and the influence of the Islamist ideology remains wholly
relevant to understanding the complexities of the modern Islamic world.
Policy analyst Seth G. Jones provides an insightful conclusion on the
threat posed by Al-Qaeda:
[D]eclarations of victory, however, underestimate al-Qaeda’s continuing capacity
for destruction. Far from being dead and buried, the terrorist organization is now
riding a resurgent tide as its affiliates engage in increasingly violent campaign of
attacks across the Middle East and North Africa. And for all the admiration inspired by brave protesters in the streets from Damascus to Sanaa, the growing instability triggered by the Arab Spring has provided al-Qaeda with fertile ground to
305
expand its influence across the region.

The evolving dynamics of the Islamic world currently project an
uncertain future as evidenced by the following: increasing violence in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, the ascending prominence of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, lingering questions surrounding the intentions of
Iranian nuclear development, and continuing sectarian bloodshed in Syria. History strongly suggests the strategic challenges presented by elements of the Islamist ideology — most specifically, acts of violence perpetuated in its name — will remain wholly relevant to the national
security concerns of America and many other members of the international community. American interests will be well served if our leaders
understand and encourage meaningful dialogue related to the roots of
modern Islamist movements and their interpretation of Islamic history.306
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